Can 8 Wait?

A review of use of force policies in Florida and perspectives on their effectiveness

A Research Report for
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Executive Summary

The Problem

While there has been an expansive public conversation around police use of force following the tragic death of George Floyd in police custody, there has been limited research to inform policy discussions. Led by Campaign Zero and their advocacy of policy reform under the banner of 8 Can’t Wait, eight policies have particularly been elevated in discussions. This includes: (1) requiring de-escalation; (2) employing a use of force continuum; (3) banning the use of chokeholds and strangleholds; (4) providing a warning prior to shooting at a civilian; (5) banning shooting at moving vehicles; (6) requiring officers to exhaust all alternative reasonable means before resorting to deadly force; (7) establishing a duty to intervene and stop other officers from using excessive force; and (8) ensuring comprehensive reporting of each time force is used or threatened to be used. To understand how individual agencies prioritize the various procedures that have been placed on center stage in the police reform conversation, it is necessary to conduct more systematic policy review and engage police leadership. Moreover, there is a need to more systematically analyze data to establish correlations between these policies and incidents of police use of force. There is also a need to develop more comprehensive analysis of patterns in the police use of force, expanding attention from simply police-involved deaths to broader patterns of police use of force, including suspect injuries and weapons discharge, as well as the circumstances that influence police use of force. This study aims to begin to fill this research gap, starting with study of the policies, perspectives, and practices of the Florida police agencies participating in the FBI use of force database.
Project Goals

Nationally, there has been heightened attention to police use of force in recent years. Our report compiles a compendium of the use of force policies and strategies employed by the 65 Florida police agencies in the study. Sixty-three of agencies were chosen based on their participation in the FBI’s Use of Force data collection program at the time of project commencement, with two additional agencies subsequently added. This will strengthen the transparency of police agencies across the state, addressing public concerns and community calls for police accountability. Canvassing police agencies regarding their policies and how they are prioritized, ensure there is consideration of their views and the efforts that they are taking to make reform in conversations around police use of force. This will help strengthen public trust in the police, build morale within police agencies, and improve police recruitment and retention.

Our original research questions were: What policies do Florida police agencies have with regard to use of force and how effective are these policies? How do these policies relate to incidents of police use of force in different jurisdictions? What other factors continue to shape police use of force in Florida? What policy reforms could reduce police use of force and improve police-community relationships?

Research Methods

There are three principal components of our research design: (1) a policy scan of police use of force plans; (2) a quantitative analysis correlating the number of violent incidents involving law enforcement officers to sociodemographic factors and policies present in each jurisdiction; and (3) qualitative interview research to examine police perspectives on use of force policies.
First, we conducted a policy scan of the Police Use of Force or Response to Resistance Policies for the Florida police agencies identified as participating in the FBI Use-of-Force database in the spring of 2021. A document content analysis was employed to identify which policies Florida police forces have. Multiple readings of the documents were conducted by members of the research team and Dedoose software was used to code the data. Evaluating police use of force and response to resistance policies, we coded when agencies had policies restricting the police use of force by: (1) requiring officers to de-escalate situation; (2) employing a use of force continuum; (3) banning the use of chokeholds and strangleholds; (4) requiring officers to give a warning prior to shooting at a civilian; (5) banning shooting at moving vehicles; (6) requiring officers to exhaust all alternative reasonable means before resorting to deadly force; (7) requiring officers to intervene and stop other officers from using excessive force; and (8) requiring comprehensive reporting of each time force is used or threatened to be used.

Following this scan, we examined any observable patterns in the agencies that have adopted policies to reduce the use of excessive force. We also examined statistical correlations between the use of force policies and the rates of different types of incidents involving police use of force. The FBI began collecting data on police use of force in 2019 to create a national database on use of force. In 2020, 64 agencies in Florida participated and provided use-of-force data. Participating agencies in the FBI Use-of-Force database provide information regarding incidents involving three types of force, including: deaths due to police use of force, serious bodily injury due to police use of force, and police firearm discharges not otherwise resulting in death or serious bodily injury. However, the FBI has not released the use of force data for the state of Florida because of low
participation rates by agencies in the state. In the absence of this information, we requested compiled statistics from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. We supplemented this data with information from the Washington Post’s Fatal Force database and the Mapping Police Violence database to provide a more comprehensive dataset. We also conducted regressions to test for other observable patterns in the data, such as any potential influence of racial, age, and income composition of the jurisdiction, relating them to the number of Use of Force incidents.

Lastly, to add experiential knowledge to our study, we also conducted interviews with representatives of the police departments, examining their perspectives on use of force policies and their effectiveness. We ultimately conducted 12 interviews, alongside two additional sets of written responses to our interview questions, across six jurisdictions. Through the interviews we sought the perspectives of police leadership on the effectiveness or feasibility of each of the eight policies currently at the center of discussion around reforming police use of force policies, as well as whether they believe other important policies are being missed from this conversation. We inquired into their understanding of the circumstances that influence police use of force in their jurisdiction. We also examined how police leadership ensures policy compliance and how often they view use of force training is necessary and effective, as well as how they investigate incidents of police use of force. Finally, we asked how they conduct policy review and change processes, and what role they perceive the public as playing in these processes. Interviews aimed to provide more nuance and allow for data triangulation to support our policy and quantitative results.

Key Findings
Finding #1: Large range of implementation of 8CantWait policies across police agencies (62% to 97%)

With each agency holding discretion over adopting its own policies, our policy scan of 65 Florida police agencies found that agencies had adopted a wide range of policies. At the time of our research, almost a third of the agencies reviewed (30.8%) had all eight policies in place. An additional 24.6% had seven of the policies in place, while 20.0% had six and 15.4% had five. Only 9.2% had four or less of the policies in place. However, as these policies provide a foundation for ensuring accountability in police use of force and public trust in police agencies, the gaps remain an area of substantial concern.

While a majority of agencies implemented each of the eight recommended policies, rates of adoption ranged from 96.9% to 61.5%. Sixty-three of the 65 reviewed agencies (96.9%) had policies outlining clear internal reporting processes to document use of force. However, as we will discuss later in the report, the effective tracking of incidents within an agency did not ensure that there was comprehensive reporting to the public. Fifty-seven agencies (87.7%) had a policy that required officers to exhaust all alternative reasonable means before resorting to deadly force. Fifty-five agencies (84.6%) had bans on shooting at moving vehicles unless it was a situation requiring the use of deadly force. Fifty-three agencies (81.5%) employed an instrument, such as a use of force continuum or matrix, that delineated stages and considerations for the escalation of force. Fifty-two agencies (80.0%) had a requirement that officers use de-escalation techniques, such as persuasion, prior to use of force, if possible. Fifty-two agencies (80.0%) explicitly stated that officers had a duty to intervene in cases where they witnessed another officer using excessive force. Forty-seven agencies (72.3%) had policies that explicitly banned the use of chokeholds and
strangleholds (including both vascular and carotid restraints) unless it was a deadly force situation. Forty agencies (61.5%) had policies requiring officers, when feasible, to give a verbal warning prior to shooting at a civilian.

Finding #2: Three 8Can'tWait policies decrease use of force reports (exhaust alternative, require de-escalation, and continuum of force)

Statistical Analysis was conducted using data obtained through a public records request to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement for the compiled Use of Force data, supplemented by the publicly available information recorded by the Mapping Police Violence project and the Washington Post’s Fatal Force database. Statistical analyses were run to determine if any of the 8 Can’t Wait policies have a depressive effect on the number of Use of Force incidents reported. Using a Poisson distribution model, it was found that three policies (i.e., Exhaust alternatives, Require De-escalation, and Continuum of Force) have a statistically significant depressive effect on the number of Use of Force reports.

Finding #3: Higher housing vacancy rates and percentage of Black population increase use of force reports

Statistical analyses were run to determine any sociodemographic factors that may affect the rate of Use of Force reports per capita. To determine relationships between the per capita rate of Use of Force incidents and sociodemographic factors, a multiple linear regression following a Box-Cox transformation on the dependent variable (i.e., per capita rate of Use of Force reports), was conducted. The resulting model is statistically significant (i.e., \( p < 0.01, R^2 = 0.5681 \)), but shows no trends (expected or otherwise) in the variable coefficients, with two exceptions. First, the
percentage of housing unit vacancy increases the transformed rate of Use of Force reports. Second, the percentage of the population identifying as Black (~8.1978) increased the transformed rate of Use of Force reports more than the percentage of the population that identifies as White (~7.2532). The small number of observations limit the reliability and power of both statistical analyses. We suggest that data be collected from additional jurisdictions to increase the observation count and include spatial data with these reports to allow additional types of analyses to be run.

Finding #4: Major lack of transparency, access, and standardization of police use of force data for the state of Florida

The most significant finding from our quantitative research was the significant barriers to using the Use of Force data collected by Florida law enforcement agencies and reported to the FDLE. The initial barrier is the difficulties and time associated with simply accessing the data, which requires submitting public records requests, waiting for the request to be fulfilled, and then filing subsequent requests to address gaps in the data. The second barrier to using FDLE data is that it is not conveyed in a format conducive to analysis and requires substantial data processing time to transform it (from pdf format) into usable data tables. A third barrier was that not all fields are consistently reported, limiting the usefulness of the data. A fourth barrier to analysis is that the data reported has no spatial components, preventing any meaningful spatial analysis of these reports. To ensure greater police transparency there need to be substantial reforms to improve data access and quality.

Finding #5: Police leader consensus on importance of requiring a duty to intervene to decrease use of force incidents
To add experiential knowledge of policy implementation issues to our study, we reviewed perspectives of several police leaders. The key findings of our qualitative research provide important context to our study, and several important themes emerged from our interviews with police leaders. All police leaders that we spoke to agreed on the importance of requiring and implementing a policy on duty to intervene. Some leaders noted that rapidly evolving events and related distractions could complicate officers’ ability to intervene, as they may not have complete awareness of what is happening in a situation. However, effective checks and balances related to the actions of fellow officers appear integral to ensuring the legitimacy of policy authority, particularly in the wake of George Floyd’s death in police custody.

Finding #6: The implementation of the majority of 8Can’tWait policies is conditional or applied “when feasible”

Addressing other policies proposed in the 8Can’tWait campaign, many police leaders agreed with the “spirit” of the proposed use of force policies but nonetheless expressed reservations about implementing them. While most agencies included versions of the majority of the recommended 8Can’tWait use of force policies, many policies were prefaced by verbiage about the policy applying “when feasible.” Thus, requirements for the use of de-escalation tactics and providing warning prior to shoot, as well as bans on the use of chokeholds and strangleholds and shooting at moving vehicles tended to be conditional. There is a need to explain to the public exceptions to some use of force practices due to exigent circumstances. Moreover, police trainers must be explicit in the need to ensure that such exceptions are rare.

Finding #7: Experienced officers make a difference in decreasing use of force reports
Another significant finding from our qualitative interviews involved the importance of experience in policing. Police leaders frequently discussed how law enforcement officers with longer careers have better outcomes with respect to use of force decisions. This part of the leaders’ discussions suggests that agencies should establish more extensive and effective use of force training for newer officers before they are assigned to shifts with direct police-citizen contact and support them to build experience in partnership with more experienced officers.

**Finding #8: Need to build trust to repair strained law enforcement relationships with communities of color**

Police leaders acknowledged that there were often strained relationships between their agency and communities of color. While police leadership strongly asserted that race should not play a role in policing and police use of force, our statistical findings indicate that racial demographics continue to play a role in use of force incidents. Police leaders emphasized the work that their agency was doing to rebuild these historically strained relationships, often emphasizing the importance of informal community engagement activities. Some also acknowledged that initiatives such as community review boards were establishing new relationships between the community and their agency. These discussions reiterate the importance of initiatives to build community trust, particularly with communities of color.

**Finding #9: Mistakes trigger changes in use of force policies**

In our interviews, police leaders addressed the three predominant aspects of how their agencies remained current and at the forefront of policy development. They looked to other agencies’ policies in nearby geographic proximity and drew from external sources such as organizations,
universities and the private sector for best practices. Leadership also played an important role in guiding policy development and policy reform. Finally, they noted that learning from mistakes that occurred oftentimes triggered changes in use of force policies.

**Finding #10: Leadership focused on image management in discussions of use of force**

We also found that police leaders regularly made efforts to promote what they believed to be positive aspects of their agency and officers. For instance, while police leaders acknowledged that some people in communities of color distrusted the police, they regularly highlighted that there were positive relationships with other members of these communities. Thus, image management seemed to be a central concern of police leaders, which is understandable in the current sociopolitical climate and the associated demands for police reform, accountability, and transparency. While redirecting the focus to positive examples of policing and agencies’ stated commitments to ethical and legal behavior is vital, it is important to ensure that this is not a substitute for making substantive policy changes. As other researchers have noted, policy reform is important to ensure police policies reflect evolving standards across the nation and work to regain public trust.

**Finding #11: Critical need to improve relationships between police agencies and research institutions**

Our interview experience underscored the need again to build better relationships between researchers and police agencies. Police reform conversations must include input from police leadership, especially with respect to the best methods of implementation for the much-needed reform. But to ensure these perspectives are included in policy research, police leaders need to
actively collaborate with researchers based on a shared interest in maintaining public safety and ensuring accountability. While the interviews we conducted were very valuable and informative, we had a difficult time recruiting participants and had a low response rate to our repeated interview requests. We believe that our examination could have been even more enlightening if there were more interview participants. Based on such a low response rate, we suggest that efforts to establish rapport between police leaders and researchers should be prioritized, as it will increase leaders’ willingness to participate in future studies. Researchers could also greatly benefit from the assistance of policymakers and community advocates who already have well-established relationships with police agencies.

Policy Recommendations

Based on our research, we offer a series more specific recommendations for local level and state level police agencies. These recommendations are not exhaustive, but represent a more explicit approach to integrating standardized data collection procedures, additional training, inclusive engagement practices, and community policing.

(A) Local level recommendations for police agencies

A1: Improve communication with communities of color

We recommend three ways for police agencies to improve communication with communities of color:

- Center and elevate the importance of transparency and communication around the use of force policies employed by agencies.
• Improve transparency and accountability through increased digital information sharing via social media.
• Conduct monthly roundtables with communities, stakeholders, and activists.

A2: Build formalized connections between police and communities of color

We recommend two ways for police agencies to formalize practices to engage communities of color:

• Create community review boards that have decision-making authority.
• Create more formal community policing programs to strengthen law enforcement and community relationships.

A3: Improve access to critical trainings on use of force for police officers

Additional training was recognized by officers as a key component of effectively implementing a use of force policy, we have four recommendations in this area:

• Support and enhance opportunities for officers to interact with community members and develop experience in community policing.
• Provide more opportunities for comprehensive use of force training.
• Offer cultural competence and implicit bias training by external organizations.
• Establish Offices of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion.

A4: Develop collaborative research relationships and data transparency

Police leaders acknowledged the importance of public transparency, and we have two recommendations to improve this area:
- Collect and share better contextual data to observe more nuanced patterns in use of force.
- Create collaborative engagement networks among law enforcement agencies and research institutions.

A5: Incorporate best practices in use of force from various sources

It is important to establish best practices as benchmarks for agencies to match and follow; thus, we recommend:

- Implement best practices found to be effective at decreasing use of force incidents.

(B) State level recommendations for organizations

B1: Standardize data collection for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and ensure it is readily available to the public

To improve law enforcement agencies’ transparency with the public, additional steps are needed in both data collection and distribution. This data is not readily available and difficult to use. We have four recommendations to improve data access:

- Collected data should be standardized.
- Data should be complete and finalized when reported.
- Additional information should be reported, including locational data.
- Use of force data should be readily available and accessible to the public.

B2: Create state- and nation-wide programs to incentivize complete data reporting
Police agencies should be supported to create additional, more consistent, and more available data. Thus, we recommend that better data collection should be incentivized by state and federal agencies:

- Incentivize police agencies engaging in data collection and maintenance by providing state and federal funding to support this work.

B3: Implement laws mandating comprehensive data tracking and reporting

To improve transparency efforts, and improve public confidence, states should pass legislation that requires law enforcement agencies to implement systems that track and report instances of police misconduct. We have two recommendations in this area.

- State legislation should require police agencies to release information on the use of force incidents to the public.
- State legislation should require state-wide tracking of officers with repeat incidents and allegations of police use of force misconduct.

Report Structure

The report to follow is divided into six sections. We begin by outlining the context that informed our research. We then review our policy scan. In the third section, we overview our statistical analysis of the data we collected. The fourth section addresses our qualitative interviews. Fifth, we provide our policy recommendations. Sixth, we summarize our conclusions and directions for future research.
1.0 Introduction and Context

On May 25, 2020, Minneapolis resident George Floyd died while being detained by police. This event can be viewed as a tipping point for police reform in contemporary society. Floyd’s death sparked protests across the nation about excessive use of force by the police, particularly involving Black community members. These protests built upon years of community-based activism by Black Lives Matter organizers, which gained prominence as a national movement challenging the racial disproportionality of police use of force after Eric Garner died while he was being detained by police in New York in July 2014. Activists and non-profit organizations have advocated for specific modifications to police departments’ allowable use of force policies. This has prompted police agencies to conduct reviews of their use of force policies. Increasingly there is public pressure for greater police accountability in the use of force.

Grassroots community organizers have been pressing for specific concrete changes in police use of force. After initiating a project to identify effective solutions to end police violence, Campaign Zero particularly targeted eight policy reforms under the banner of 8CantWait. The project specifically issued a call for police departments to adopt eight reforms to reduce the excessive use of force. These policies include agencies instituting: a requirement that officers attempt to de-escalate situations, a continuum for the use of force, a ban on chokeholds and strangleholds, the issuance of warnings prior to shooting, a ban shooting at moving vehicles, a requirement to exhaust all alternatives prior to the use of force, an explicit duty to intervene if another officer is using excessive force, and comprehensive reporting of use of force. Conducting a survey of use of force policies for ninety-one police forces within major US cities in 2016, they found systemic gaps in these policies in the eight indicated areas. Moreover, using a preliminary regression, they found that police forces that adopted these policies had lower numbers of police-involved deaths. Their
research indicates that major police departments in Florida had widely varying policy approaches to addressing police use of force. Though they have continually updated their database, in early 2021 when we initiated this research, Campaign Zero identified that Boca Raton had four of the recommended proposed policies, Clearwater had six, Delay Beach had four, Fort Lauderdale had two, Fort Myers had three, Jacksonville had three, Miami had seven, Orlando had three, St Petersburg had six, Tampa Bay had eight, and West Palm had four.

Recently, the Florida Police Chiefs Association created a Subcommittee on Accountability and Societal Change to discuss and set forth “aspirational goals” for use of force policies (FPCA, 2020, p. 2). The Subcommittee’s report was approved on September 3, 2020, and was in accordance with the National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force (2020) issued collectively by 11 national police organizations and unions, including the Association of State Criminal Investigative Agencies, Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, Fraternal Order of Police, Hispanic American Police Command Officers Association, International Association of Chiefs of Police, International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement, National Organization Black Law Enforcement Executives, National Association of Women Law Enforcement Executives, National Organization of Police Organizations, and National Tactical Officers Association.

The Florida Police Chiefs Association Subcommittee recommended policies that banned chokeholds, required de-escalation, required issuing warning before shooting if feasible, established a duty to intervene during another officer’s use of excessive force, and ensured comprehensive reporting of all uses of force. The Subcommittee also noted all Florida policy agencies already have one of two variants of continuum of force policies. But the Subcommittee
stated that it perceived bans on shooting at vehicles and the exhaustion of all alternatives before shooting as impractical policies. Moreover, the Subcommittee’s report is not a mandate; it is a suggestion for Florida police agencies. This ultimately leaves each agency to determine what policies it will enact or eliminate. To understand how individual agencies prioritize the various procedures that have been placed on center stage in the police reform conversation, it is necessary to conduct more systematic policy review and engage police leadership. Moreover, there is a need to more systematically analyze data on the police use of force, expanding attention from simply police-involved deaths to broader patterns of police use of force, including suspect injuries and weapons discharge.

8 Can’t Wait

The use of physical force by police officers is a pressing social justice issue that commands the attention of the public, media, academics, and practitioners in the criminal justice system. Officers have the power—and, arguably, the duty—to use force in order to protect the safety of the public and other officers. Empirical research has indicated that the use of force can occur due to various characteristics of the encounter (e.g., arrest), suspect (e.g., under the influence), officer (e.g., level of education), and geographical area (e.g., racial demographics) (Bolger, 2015; Brandl & Stroshine, 2013; Kahn et al., 2016; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Although the use of force is generally accepted, protests in the current sociopolitical climate focus their objections on acts perceived as unjustifiable or excessive within the circumstances and context of the police-citizen interaction (Ariel et al., 2015; Fridell, 2017). Such perceptions are likely to increase tensions between police and the community, and create damage to the legitimacy of the policing institution (Mullinix, 2020; Smith & Holmes, 2014; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2004).
In order to address the “crisis of confidence in the police” (Garner et al., 2018, p. 1), scholars have discussed the need for and feasibility of several proposals such as body-worn cameras, external review boards, increased social interaction, and implicit bias training (Wolfe et al., 2020; Worden et al., 2018; Wright & Headley, 2020). Notwithstanding such proposals, the eight tenets of Campaign Zero’s campaign are at the forefront of the use-of-force conversations. These specific calls for reform have prompted police agencies across the nation to conduct self-evaluations of their policies, including those led by the Subcommittee on Accountability and Societal Change of the Florida Police Chiefs Association. This trend necessitates a review of such policies in Florida agencies, which will address public concerns about police transparency and accountability, and give agencies the opportunity to explain their support for and against certain strategies and revise their policies accordingly. Our original research questions were: What policies do Florida police agencies have with regard to use of force and how effective are these policies? How do these policies relate to incidents of police use of force in different jurisdictions? What other factors continue to shape police use of force in Florida? What policy reforms could reduce police use of force and improve police-community relationships?

2.0 Policy Scan Findings

2.1 Overview

With each agency holding discretion over adopting its own policies, our policy scan of 65 Florida police agencies found that agencies had adopted a wide range of policies. At the time of our research, almost a third of the agencies reviewed (30.8%) had all eight policies in place. An additional 24.6% had seven of the policies in place, while 20.0% had six and 15.4% had five. Only 9.2% had four or fewer of the policies in place. However, as these policies provide a foundation
for ensuring accountability in police use of force and public trust in police agencies, the gaps remain an area of substantial concern.

While a majority of agencies implemented each of the eight recommended policies, rates of adoption ranged from 96.9% to 61.5%. Sixty-three of the 65 reviewed agencies (96.9%) had policies outlining clear internal reporting processes to document use of force. However, as we will discuss later in the report, the effective tracking of incidents within an agency did not ensure that there was comprehensive reporting to the public. Fifty-seven agencies (87.7%) had a policy that required officers to exhaust all alternative means before resorting to deadly force, when feasible. Fifty-five agencies (84.6%) had bans on shooting at moving vehicles unless it was a situation requiring the use of deadly force. Fifty-three agencies (81.5%) employed an instrument, such as a use of force continuum or matrix, that delineated stages and considerations for the escalation of force. Fifty-two agencies (80.0%) had a requirement that officers use de-escalation techniques, such as persuasion, prior to use of force. Fifty-two agencies (80.0%) explicitly stated that officers had a duty to intervene in cases where they witnessed another officer using excessive force. Forty-seven agencies (72.3%) had policies that explicitly banned chokeholds and strangleholds (including both vascular and carotid restraints). Forty agencies (61.5%) had policies requiring officers, when feasible, to give a verbal warning before shooting at a civilian.

2.2 Methodological Approach

We conducted a policy scan of the Police Use of Force or Response to Resistance Policies for 65 Florida policy agencies. A document content analysis was employed to identify which policies Florida police forces have. Multiple readings of the documents were conducted by members of the
research team and Dedoose software, a qualitative analysis program, was used to code the data. Evaluating police use of force and response to resistance policies, we coded when agencies had police use of force policies: (1) requiring officers to de-escalate a situation; (2) employing a use of force continuum; (3) banning the use of chokeholds and strangleholds; (4) requiring officers to give a warning before shooting at a civilian; (5) banning shooting at moving vehicles; (6) requiring officers to exhaust all alternative means before resorting to deadly force; (7) requiring officers to intervene and stop other officers from using excessive force, and (8) requiring comprehensive reporting of each time force is used or threatened to be used.

2.3 Findings

This section will begin by discussing the policies that have been most comprehensively adopted, and proceed to those that are the least popular.

Clear Internal Reporting Processes to Document Use of Force

The vast majority of police agencies, 63 of 65 (96.9%), had policies outlining clear internal reporting processes to document use of force. For instance, Milton Police Department clearly stated processes for reporting:

*Reporting Requirements: On all use of force incidents, a Subject Resistance Report will be completed and forwarded to the Operations Commander. The Subject Resistance Report is found in the Offense module of our RMS, (SmartCOP). A. The reporting officer will complete a Subject Resistance Report in the original incident report detailing the time, circumstances, and medical treatment. B. The narrative should consist of the actions leading to the resistance and control measures used ONLY. (205.7.0)*
Most internal agency reporting requirements mandated comprehensive documentation of all uses of force, rather than only requiring documentation regarding deadly force. The importance of comprehensiveness is elaborated in the policy of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office.

\[\text{In the event death or great bodily harm occurs, the investigative procedures, reporting procedures and the administrative relief from duty, as defined in the section of this general order titled Deadly Force, shall apply, otherwise:}\]

\[A. \text{ A member who has a use of force against any person shall immediately contact a supervisor and apprise the supervisor of the circumstances surrounding the incident.}\]

\[B. \text{ Law enforcement members shall complete a Use of Force Incident in BlueTeam and an ACISS Incident / Offense report when the member has a use of force on any individual prior to the end of their shift.}\]

\[C. \text{ The display of a less-lethal weapon as a show of force will be documented in the narrative portion [sic] of an ACISS report or in an incident report for Department of Detention and Corrections personnel. (13-03.10)}\]

Thus, agencies effectively track a range of use of force incidents, including but not limited to deadly force incidents. However, as we will detail later in this report, the effective compilation and tracking of incidents within an agency did not ensure that this information was widely available to the public. Even though our research sampled those agencies who had opted to participate in the FBI Use of Force Database, there were substantial gaps in the systematic public reporting of use of force statistics.

Exhausting All Alternatives

The second most widely implemented policy was a requirement that officers exhaust all alternative reasonable means before resorting to deadly force. Fifty-seven of the 65 reviewed agencies (87.7%) had a version of this policy. These policies were typically listed in the introduction of the policies as an overarching guiding principle. Fernandina Beach Police Department provided an exemplary policy outlining the requirement to minimize the use of force:
The value placed on human life requires that officers exercise the utmost care and sound judgment when utilizing any level of force when responding to resistance or protecting a person. As such force may be used only to a degree sufficient to overcome resistance, affect a lawful arrest, or protect the officer or another person from death or bodily harm. (I, C).

They continue to later elaborate: “If an officer finds it objectively reasonable to utilize force, the officer shall use the minimal amount of force that is necessary to control a person” (III, E). Similarly, New Port Richey Police Department introduces its Use of Force – Response to Resistance Policy by clearly stating the principle that use of force should be the minimum necessary: “When officers are engaged in any response to resistance encounter, they are responsible for making the preservation of life their first priority and use only the amount of force objectively reasonable to bring the incident under control.”

Bans on Shooting at Moving Vehicles

The next most common policy was a ban on shooting at moving vehicles, unless it was a situation requiring the use of deadly force. Fifty-five agencies (84.6%) included this policy in their guidelines. For instance, Melbourne Beach Police Department clearly outlines this prohibition: “Officers shall not discharge a firearm at or from a moving vehicle except as the ultimate measure of self-defense or in defense of another when the suspect is using deadly force by means other than the vehicle” (4.0.08). Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office echoes this ban: “Shooting AT a moving vehicle will be avoided in all instances except those which are justified by a life or death situation. Shooting FROM a moving vehicle is PROHIBITED UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES” (K). Additionally, directives also regularly indicated that officers should not directly impede the path of a vehicle, and thereby put themselves at risk of great bodily harm, unless the officer is physically unable to move out of the path of the oncoming vehicle.
Use of Force Instruments

Fifty-three agencies (81.5%) employed an instrument that delineated stages and considerations for the escalation of force. Different policies were coded as providing formal frameworks to guide use of force, including: response to resistance matrix / use of force continuum, or the critical decision making model. The Response to Resistance Matrix, developed by the State of Florida Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission and sometimes also referred to as the use of force continuum, sought to guide officers by providing a series of appropriate levels of response to different subject resistance levels, delineated as: (1) presence; (2) verbal resistance; (3) passive physical resistance; (4) active physical resistance; (5) aggressive physical resistance; and (6) aggravated physical resistance. The corresponding levels of officer response, in order of severity, are: (1) officer presence; (2) verbal direction; (3) empty hand physical control; (4) intermediate weapons; (5) incapacitating control; and (6) lethal force. The Critical Decision-Making Model similarly relies on an escalating set of responses to resistance. However, rather than focusing on specific correspondent levels of resistance and response, the model focuses on the totality of circumstances, reflecting U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence (Graham v. Connor, 1989). This use of force standard recognizes the fluid and dynamic nature of police encounters with subjects when determining the objective reasonable, and therefore legally justified, level of response. The totality of circumstances includes consideration of the subject’s form of resistance and response options available to the police officer, alongside reasonably perceived factors in the situation, including: (1) severity of the crime; (2) immediacy of subject threat; (3) mental or psychiatric history of the subject (if known to the officer); (4) violent history of subject (if known to the officer); (5) combative skills of subject; (6) access to weapons of the subject; (7) vulnerability of innocent
bystanders; (8) number of subjects versus number of officers; (9) duration of confrontation; (10) size, age, weight, and physical condition of the subject; (11) size, age, weight, physical condition, and defensive tactics expertise of the officer; and (12) environmental factors, such as physical terrain and weather conditions.

De-Escalation

Fifty-two agencies (80.0%) had a requirement that officers use de-escalation techniques, such as persuasion, prior to use of force. Pasco County Sheriff’s Office clearly describes the use of de-escalation tactics:

Many physical encounters may be avoided with verbal dialogue, a process often called verbal de-escalation. By disengaging or de-escalating a subject, a deputy can give the subject the opportunity to comply with the deputy’s lawful commands or distract the subject from the focus of his/her anger and non-compliance. When practical, deputies are directed to attempt to gain control of the situation by using verbal de-escalation, verbal commands or other verbal distraction techniques. [CFA 4.01B] (1.b.)

Manatee County Sheriff’s Office further elaborates the use of de-escalation techniques.

7.0 Deputies will use de-escalation and force-mitigation tactics and techniques whenever safe and feasible to do so. It should be every deputy’s goal to resolve all situations without using force. ... When time and circumstances reasonably permit.

7.1 Deputies will receive training on the Critical Decision-Making (CDM) model as well as when and how to appropriately use de-escalation and force-mitigation.

7.2 Time offers additional options and resources to resolve an incident with minimal force. When all of the reasonably known circumstances indicate it is safe, prudent, and feasible to do so, deputies shall attempt to slow down, reduce the intensity, and stabilize the situation in order to employ additional time and create additional options for de-escalation.

7.3 De-escalation provides the on scene deputy time to call for additional deputies, utilize other tactics, or request specialty assistance, and may increase the available force options through consideration of other viable alternatives such as:

7.3.1 Decreasing the exposure to the potential threat by using distance or physical barriers between an uncooperative subject and a deputy.
7.3.2 Containing the threat.

7.3.3 Maximizing the use of cover or concealment to reduce the deputy’s exposure to potential threats by placing the deputy’s [sic] in a safer position

7.3.4 Communicating from a safe position to gain the subject’s compliance through the use of verbal persuasion, advisements, and/or warnings. Generally, communication techniques should engage active listening to calm agitated individuals and promote rational decision-making.

7.3.5 The deputy’s physical actions may also de-escalate a potentially volatile/violent situation; i.e., exhibiting a relaxed body language.

While the level of detail in Manatee County was exceptional, the majority of agencies that advocated de-escalation in their policies included clear definitions to communicate the meaning of the concept to officers.

Duty to Intervene

Eighty percent (52 agencies) explicitly stated that officers had a duty to intervene in cases where they witnessed another officer using excessive force. For instance, Winter Springs was emphatic about this policy:

All members are tasked with the duty to intervene. The duty to intervene is an attempt to stop the use of excessive force by another officer when it is objectively reasonable to do so. It is imperative to exercise the duty to intervene in order to continue to ensure the public confidence in law enforcement and protect members of society appropriately” (16-2.2, B.).

Clay County Sheriff’s Office similarly clearly required police intervention to prevent use of excessive force: “Any member witnessing the use of excessive and unnecessary force will intervene if reasonably able to do so to stop the excessive or unnecessary force. Members witnessing the excessive or unnecessary force by another member will report the incident to their supervisor as soon as possible” (II, D).
Bans on Chokeholds and Strangleholds

Forty-seven agencies (72.3%) had policies that explicitly banned the use of chokeholds and strangleholds (including both vascular and carotid restraints). For instance, the Kissimmee Police Department was particularly clear: “Chokeholds/Vascular Neck Restraints is any technique used to restrain an individual that may restrict the flow of air by compressing the windpipe or occludes both carotid blood vessels simultaneously. The use of chokeholds/vascular neck restraints are prohibited, unless the use of deadly force is allowed by law” (401.05). Similarly, Kenneth City Police Department explained that both types of restraint were banned in non-deadly force situations.

7. *Members will NOT use a choke hold technique as a restraint technique on any person. Choke holds are considered a use of deadly force and officers are only permitted to use this technique as a last resort of deadly force.*

8. *An officer shall not use vascular neck restraints to restrain or secure any person or any response to resistance except in circumstances where deadly force is authorized. (D.7-8)*

While the majority of police agencies banned the use of both chokeholds and vascular neck restraints, a small number of forces still trained and permitted officers to use vascular neck restraints, while others still left the issue unaddressed.

Warning Prior to Shooting

Forty agencies (61.5%) had policies requiring officers to give verbal warnings prior to shooting at a civilian, when feasible. For instance, Palmetto Police Department instructed: “Officers shall give verbal warnings prior to discharging their firearms (when practical)” (101.10(4)). Manatee County Sheriff’s Office again provided detailed policy guidance around warnings prior to shooting.
8.0 Deputies will provide clear instructions and warnings whenever feasible before using force. Whenever safe and feasible, deputies should not use force immediately when a person is noncompliant to lawful commands. Instead, whenever safe and feasible, before using force, deputies should:

8.1 Provide clear instructions and warnings;

8.2 Seek to communicate using non-verbal techniques when a verbal warning would be inadequate (such as when the person does not speak English, or is unable to hear or understand warnings);

8.3 Indicate the consequences of refusing to comply with a command, including that force will be used unless the person complies; and

8.4 Give the person a reasonable amount of time to comply.

While agencies with the requirement to issue verbal warnings tended to be brief, akin to the Palmetto Police Department policy, the more detailed Manatee County Sheriff’s Office guidance elaborated the detailed implementation of warnings at the heart of the policy.
3.0 Statistical Analysis

3.1 Overview
Statistical analyses were conducted on Use of Force incident data with the goal of finding actionable trends. Statistical trends were found correlating the likelihood of a violent incident report to five of the 8 Can’t Wait policies. Three policies seem to decrease the likelihood of a violent incident report in any given jurisdiction, while two policies seem to increase this likelihood. Relationships between the Use of Force reporting rate per capita and sociodemographic factors were found, with few distinct trends observable for the variable groups (e.g., age, race, income, home value, etc.). The limited number of reports obtained for Florida jurisdictions limit the power and reliability of these analyses. Visualizing the number of Use of Force reports and the number and presence of Campaign Zero policies do not present trends with policies or geographic regions.

3.2 Methodological Approach
To determine trends in reported Florida law enforcement officer use of force incidents, data on the incidents were obtained from three sources. Police Use of Force incident counts for each jurisdiction were obtained by requesting all data from the Use of Force incident database held by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). The data was received on March 8, 2022. These reports were voluntarily submitted to the FDLE by each participating jurisdiction following the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Use of Force reporting guidelines. Two additional data sources were used to include more comprehensive data and increase the number of reports: the Washington Post’s Fatal Force database and the Mapping Police Violence database, both accessed on June 6, 2022. Also obtained from the FDLE was the collection of monthly zero incidents. It is unknown if the zero incident report entries were self-reported by jurisdictions or entered by FDLE
for each jurisdiction starting at the start of that jurisdiction’s participation. The list of jurisdictions and the number of zero reports for the jurisdiction is included below in Table 1. Demographic information was obtained from the Census Bureau using the TidyCensus package in R. The demographic data were transformed from raw counts to proportions (e.g., from number of people within the ages of 15 and 19 to percentage of the population that is between the ages of 15 and 19). Reports were aggregated into counts based on the jurisdiction reporting or, for Use of Force incidents reported in media databases, the jurisdiction the incident occurred in.

**Table 1.** Law enforcement agencies that report Use of Force incidents to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the corresponding number of monthly zero-incident reports per agency. Note that agencies began reporting on different dates. Data obtained from Florida Department of Law Enforcement Use of Force database obtained through a public records request.

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Next, use of force policies were collected from select jurisdictions. These collected policies were then scanned for the presence/absence of the eight policies advocated for by the 8 Can’t Wait initiative. Results from this scanning were used to develop the maps and dashboard presented later in this report. The policy scan aimed to correspond to the agencies reporting to the FBI’s Use of Force database. A total of 65 sets of policies were collected. However, correspondence to reporting agencies was complicated by shifts in which agencies were reporting, with additional agencies electing to participate in reporting and others reversing their decision and opting out. Moreover, a relatively large number of the participating agencies have not reported a use of force incident in the period for which they have reported incidents.

Analyzing use of force policies, we used different models to investigate the relationship between the sociodemographic features of jurisdictions, the number of policies implemented, and the number of use of force incidents reported by the jurisdiction and media sources. Because the raw count of use of force incidents had a large variance between jurisdictions, no relationships between the count of use of force incidents and the count of 8 Can’t Wait policies implemented were found using a linear model; instead, a Poisson regression model was used.
To determine the relationships between the raw counts of use of force and linear, negative binomial, zero inflated, and zero inflated Poisson models were investigated but none have usable results. Use of Force report count data were then normalized into reports per capita (i.e., the number of reports divided by the total population of the jurisdiction). A linear regression resulted in a model relating Use of Force report per capita rates and sociodemographic variables only for the jurisdictions that reported at least one violent incident.

### 3.3 Findings

Of the 339 potential jurisdictions in Florida (listed on the FDLE website), 64 jurisdictions submitted use of force data to FDLE under the FBI’s Use of Force reporting guidelines as of March 8, 2022, however, by August 15, 2022, there were only 52 jurisdictions reporting Use of Force incidents. Of the 65 examined jurisdictions in our study, all but two have implemented a comprehensive reporting policy (96.9% implemented) similar to what is proposed by 8 Can’t Wait. The policy requiring officers to warn individuals before officers discharge their firearms is implemented the least, with 61.5% of jurisdictions (40 of 65) implementing this policy. See Table 2 for a complete breakdown of the number and percent of Florida jurisdictions that implement each of the 8 Can’t Wait policies.

**Table 2.** 8 Can’t Wait policies and the number of jurisdictions that have implemented the respective policy. Data obtained through a policy scan of the responding Florida jurisdictions’ Use of Force/Response to Resistance policies.

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<tr>
<th>8 Can’t Wait Policy</th>
<th>Number of Jurisdictions Implementing</th>
<th>Percent of Jurisdictions</th>
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<td>Policy</td>
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<td>Ban Chokeholds</td>
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<td>No Shooting at Moving Vehicles</td>
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<td>Require De-escalation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The median number of 8 Can’t Wait policies implemented by jurisdictions that participate in the voluntary reporting is 7, the maximum is 8, and the minimum is 2 of the 8 policies. Figure 1 shows that over half of the self-reporting jurisdictions have implemented 7 or 8 of the 8 Can’t Wait policies (as expected from the overall median of 7 policies implemented) and over a quarter of the jurisdictions investigated have at least 6 of the policies implemented.
Figure 1. The total number of 8 Can’t Wait policies implemented by jurisdictions based on if the jurisdiction has implemented a given policy.

Use of Force reports and policy presence

Use of Force incident counts are highly skewed, having a mean of 1.65 Use of Force incidents per jurisdiction, a median and minimum both of 0 incidents, and a maximum of 90 incidents reported by media databases (a single jurisdiction had 26 incidents reported). Figure 2 shows the distribution of Use of Force incident counts where the jurisdiction has implemented a given policy. All jurisdictions that have implemented at least one of the 8 Can’t Wait policies have at least one use of force incident reported.
**Figure 2.** Number of Use of Force incidents for jurisdictions that have implemented the 8 policies advocated for by the 8 Can’t Wait initiative. Dots are outliers (i.e., at values at least 1.5 times the third quartile). Data obtained from Florida Department of Law Enforcement Use of Force database obtained through a public records request, Mapping Police Violence, and Washington Post Use of Force databases, and through a policy scan of responding Florida jurisdictions’ Use of Force/Response to Resistance policies.
The relationship between the presence of the eight policies and reported use of force incidents was determined using a Poisson regression model, where the presence of a policy increases the logarithmic likelihood of use of force report counts by the coefficient for that policy. The policies that were found to have a statistically significant relationship with the number of use of force incident reports are Continuum of Force, Duty to Intervene, Exhaust Alternatives, Require De-escalation, and Warn before Shooting. Table 3 shows the value of the coefficients, which range in value from -0.9313 for the Exhaust Alternatives Policy to 1.055 for the Warn Before Shooting policy. This approximately corresponds to 0.39 times decrease and 2.76 times increase in reported Use of Force events when the Exhaust Alternatives and Warn Before Shooting policies are implemented, respectively. The Exhaust Alternatives, Continuum of Force, and Require De-escalation policies have a depressive effect on Use of Force incidents reported by both jurisdictions and media databases, while the Duty to Intervene and Warn Before Shooting policies increase the number of use of force incident reports from both sources. This suggests that the Exhaust Alternatives, Continuum of Force, and Require De-escalation policies reduce reported incidents (though the latter two have weaker relationships as indicated by their p-values). Counter-intuitively, the presence of the Duty to Intervene and Warn Before Shooting policies in the jurisdiction seem to increase the likelihood that there are more Use of Force reports per capita.
Table 3. Policies that affect the number of Use of Force events reported using a Poisson regression model, the coefficient determined, and the p-value. The lower the p-value, the stronger the relationship. The coefficient indicates the logarithmic likelihood increase in the number of Use of Force events with the presence of the policy. The likelihood impact is the translated impact of the coefficient found through this regression model and can be read as “if the policy is implemented, there is an x times likelihood that there is a use of force incident reported,” where “x” is the likelihood impact value for that policy. The calculation to find the likelihood impact value is $e^{\text{coefficient}}$, where “e” is approximately 2.718282. Data obtained through policy scans of responding Florida jurisdictions’ Use of Force/Response to Resistance policies. Data from Florida Department of Law Enforcement Use of Force database obtained through a public records request, supplemented by publicly available data from Mapping Police Violence and Washington Post Use of Force databases. Policy data generated through a policy scan of responding Florida jurisdictions’ Use of Force/Response to Resistance policies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Likelihood impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exhaust Alternatives</td>
<td>-0.9313</td>
<td>&lt; 0.01</td>
<td>0.3940411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty to Intervene</td>
<td>0.6412</td>
<td>&lt; 0.01</td>
<td>1.898758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warn Before Shooting</td>
<td>1.0155</td>
<td>&lt; 0.01</td>
<td>2.760743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuum of Force</td>
<td>-0.2619</td>
<td>0.0099</td>
<td>0.769588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Require De-escalation</td>
<td>-0.2748</td>
<td>0.01062</td>
<td>0.7597241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Use of Force reports and sociodemographic factors

Once transformed to per capita rates, the Use of Force reports data are nearly normal, though low, with a maximum of 0.00756 Use of Force reports per resident. The residuals of the linear model for these raw rates were leptokurtic (i.e., highly concentrated around the mean), indicating that the model used was inappropriate. However, when the per capita use of force rate was subject to a Box-Cox transformation with a lambda of -0.0606060606060606 using the formula

$$n = \frac{(r^{\text{lambda}} - 1)}{\text{lambda}}$$
(where \( r \) is the original rate, and \( n \) is the Box-Cox transformed rate), analysis yielded a linear model that satisfied the normality requirement for multiple linear regression. The statistically significant coefficients for this multiple regression are found in Table 4.

**Table 4.** Variables in the model with their coefficients and the p-value. Variables are percentages of the population (e.g., percent of the population that is White or between the ages of 5 and 9), percent of housing units vacant, percent of housing units rented within a certain range, or percent of houses within a certain range in each jurisdiction. This model was conducted on a Box-Cox transformed dependent variable (number of reported police incidents per capita) using a lambda of -0.0606060606060606. The coefficients indicate the effect of a unit increase of that variable has on the Box-Cox transformed dependent variable. A smaller p-value indicates a stronger relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable. Data obtained from the United States Census Bureau 5-year American Community Survey for 2019 using the TidyCensus package in R. Data obtained from a public records request for Florida Department of Law Enforcement Use of Force database, as well as the publicly available Mapping Police Violence and Washington Post Use of Force databases. Policy data generated through a policy scan of responding Florida jurisdictions’ Use of Force/Response to Resistance policies. Demographic data obtained from the 2019 5-year American Community Survey published by the United States Census Bureau.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sociodemographic factor</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing - Vacant</td>
<td>2.022065716</td>
<td>0.000245836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race - White</td>
<td>7.253208343</td>
<td>0.013915967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race - Black</td>
<td>8.197837066</td>
<td>0.005483439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age – Under 5</td>
<td>16.07068789</td>
<td>0.067838652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age – Between 5 and 9</td>
<td>-17.5303297</td>
<td>0.101112943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age – Between 9 and 14</td>
<td>25.25290836</td>
<td>0.019069477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age – Between 14 and 19</td>
<td>-44.21247706</td>
<td>1.97E-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age – Between 29 and 34</td>
<td>-24.72564688</td>
<td>0.016058833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age – Between 35 and 44</td>
<td>15.05241886</td>
<td>0.00924694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age – Between 75 and 84</td>
<td>-36.44134303</td>
<td>5.29E-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age – 85 and up</td>
<td>24.03642843</td>
<td>0.072733014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income – Between $10,000 and $14,999</td>
<td>0.325720849</td>
<td>0.007844979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income – Between $25,000 and $29,999</td>
<td>-0.491466327</td>
<td>0.00746664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income – Between $40,000 and $44,999</td>
<td>0.145691602</td>
<td>0.060760398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Mean (e)</td>
<td>std (e)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income – between $125,000 and $149,999</td>
<td>0.187806413</td>
<td>0.001946454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income – Over $200,000</td>
<td>-0.125463543</td>
<td>0.017932077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home value – under $10,000</td>
<td>-33.99622772</td>
<td>0.00410398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home value – between $20,000 - $24,999</td>
<td>-40.69506167</td>
<td>0.014474968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home value – between $25,000 - $29,999</td>
<td>-23.26174495</td>
<td>0.120968392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home value – between $35,000 - $39,999</td>
<td>34.1641896</td>
<td>0.024453684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home value – between $45,000 - $49,999</td>
<td>-39.72990538</td>
<td>3.15E-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home value – between $70,000 - $79,999</td>
<td>-14.73963685</td>
<td>0.069455024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home value – between $80,000 - $89,999</td>
<td>-10.81200706</td>
<td>0.181805115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home value – between $175,000 - $199,999</td>
<td>-21.92952157</td>
<td>0.005463202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home value – between $200,000 - $249,999</td>
<td>-12.07033564</td>
<td>0.005005748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home value – between $300,000 - $399,999</td>
<td>-6.71149455</td>
<td>0.089185962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home value – between $400,000 - $499,999</td>
<td>-15.72674442</td>
<td>0.008427659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home value – between $500,000 - $749,999</td>
<td>-7.700678671</td>
<td>0.121457837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home value – between $750,000 - $1,000,000</td>
<td>-9.198734017</td>
<td>0.206613302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent – between $150 - $199</td>
<td>-26.10433292</td>
<td>0.003985081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent – between $250 - $299</td>
<td>-40.03792495</td>
<td>0.000465177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent – between $350 - $399</td>
<td>15.57212895</td>
<td>0.009921957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent – between $450 - $499</td>
<td>-17.35969152</td>
<td>0.005512961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent – between $500 - $549</td>
<td>-21.21884349</td>
<td>1.33E-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent – between $600 - $649</td>
<td>-9.416278798</td>
<td>0.022271874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent – between $750 - $799</td>
<td>-8.124834253</td>
<td>0.15008315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent – between $900 - $999</td>
<td>-11.11349638</td>
<td>0.000632596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent – between $1000 - $1249</td>
<td>-7.971608766</td>
<td>0.003138972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent – between $1250 - $1499</td>
<td>-7.587930122</td>
<td>0.010647415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent – between $1500 - $1999</td>
<td>-11.90235576</td>
<td>7.58E-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent – between $2500 - $2999</td>
<td>-12.82803981</td>
<td>0.071649902</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the effects of sociodemographic factors on the violent incident reports per capita are varied, with the percentage of homes valued between $35,000 and $39,999 being the maximum with coefficient of 34.1641896 (i.e., for every percentage increase in this home value category, there is a corresponding increase of 34.1641896 reports per capita, transformed by the Box-Cox transformation, all other variables being equal). The greatest depressive effect in the model comes from the percentage of the population aged between 15 and 19 years-old (-44.212477061013), corresponding to a 1.617 X 10^-10 impact on the untransformed variable, all other variables being equal. The percentage of White people has a slightly lower positive effect on the transformed dependent variable than the percentage of Black people (7.25320834282255 and 8.19783706614609, respectively). Eleven of the forty-one variables included have positive effects on the transformed dependent variable of reported violent incidents per capita, while the rest have negative (i.e., depressive) effects on the transformed rate of reported violent incidents. To determine the per capita rate of use of force reports, the following equation is used:

\[ Y = \left( Z \ast \lambda \ast \frac{1}{\lambda} \right) \]

where \( Y \) is the transformed dependent variable, \( Z \) is the transformed dependent variable, and \( \lambda \) is the transformation value used in the Box-Cox transformation.

Within categories, there are no consistent trends in either variable coefficient or p-value. In addition to no trends being found, the opposite of some expected results was found. For example, it was not expected that a one percent increase in the population over 84 years-old would increase the rate of reported violent incidents. It was expected that increasing the percentage of higher home values would decrease the rate of reported violent incidents, but this model indicates that lower
home values have a greater depressive effect overall than higher home values. The only exception is the percentage of homes worth between $35,000 and $39,999. This home value classification has the only positive coefficient for this variable group. The effect of income ranges on the transformed per capita rate of violent incident reports is low, with magnitudes of $10^{-1}$ for both positive and depressive factors, having lower effects on the violent incident report rate than any other variable.

**Limitations**

There are multiple limitations to this model. First, the data obtained from the FDLE mainly contains data on firearm usage (129 reports), with all other Use of Force reports totaling less than half that (62 reports). It appears that only firearm usage is being reported by some jurisdictions, and there may be underreporting of incidents from some jurisdictions. To counteract this bias, we used publicly available Use of Force data from press sites. Overall, the press data contained higher numbers of incidents per jurisdiction, however, this was not consistent and some jurisdictions self-reported more incidents than were picked up by the media sources. This further highlights the variance in reporting between different jurisdictions. From across different jurisdictions, participating agencies in the FBI Use-of-Force database commit to provide information regarding incidents involving three types of force: deaths due to police use of force, serious bodily injury due to police use of force, and police firearm discharges not otherwise resulting in death or serious bodily injury. It appears clear that reporting these figures consistently remains a major issue.

There is an additional limitation: aside from no source being comprehensive, none of the three sources (Mapping Police Violence, Washington Post’s database, and FDLE reports) contain all the
same information. The FBI Use-of-Force database is designed to include numerous other incident attributes, including: incident location (i.e., city), type of location (i.e., street, business, home, etc.), reason for initial contact (i.e., routine patrol, traffic stop, etc.), race/ethnicity/age of the officer(s) and suspect(s), officer years on the force, whether the officer was on duty, assessed suspect threat to officer or other person, whether the suspect resisted arrest, officer injury, weapon involvement, known suspect impairment, and seriousness of suspected offense. However, this information was not being systematically collected by the participating agencies reporting to the FDLE. For instance, locational data is not included in the FDLE database, making spatial analysis rough and on a jurisdictional basis only. Moreover, the subjects table obtained from FDLE does not contain any header information, making it difficult to determine the exact attribute that each column may refer to. The Washington Post data contains only information on the subject, so it lacks numerous attributes that we hoped to control for and evaluate in our analysis of statistical patterns between policies and incidents of use of force. Moreover, in the Washington Post data, many fields are missing. The Mapping Police Violence project contains the most comprehensive data, though still contains empty fields. This database includes the street address of the incident, and is beginning to include jurisdictional demographic information, but it is sporadic.

Spatial analysis is difficult for this data as it is challenging to differentiate jurisdictions that do not report and those that report no incidents. If differentiated, there are additional challenges to conduct spatial analysis (such as spatial autocorrelation - how clustered the rate of reported incidents is), as this requires contiguous areas. Regressing the transformed dependent variable on latitude and longitude results in significant relationships (latitude: $3.45 \times 10^{-6}$, $p = 6.86 \times 10^{-8}$; longitude: -
1.534 \times 10^{-7}, p = 0.0646), however, the residuals (i.e., observed differences of observations from the trend line) are not normal and thus the model is not valid. It is, however, suggestive.

Lastly, there is no systemic accounting for use of force incidents. With only 204 jurisdictional observations (i.e., 204 jurisdictions with at least one self- or media-reported incident), statistical analyses are limited to few variables at one time (as only as many variables may be tested as there are observations). Further, Indianapolis, IN, Minneapolis, MN, and Dallas, TX operate a reporting program that captures all use of force performed by officers, leading to thousands of reports per year. For example, Indianapolis recorded over 19,000 Use of Force reports in 2021 and Dallas recorded 2,944 in 2019. All Florida jurisdictions recorded 184 incidents from May 1, 2019 through January 07, 2021. Such a small sample size limits statistical analyses and prevents deeper interrogation of any trends present. Fortunately, Florida enacted a Use of Force data collection law (Florida Statutes section 943.6872) that requires all jurisdictions to report incidents that result in “serious bodily injury, death, or discharge of a firearm at a person” to the FDLE monthly. These data are to be included in the FBI’s Use of force database, per this statute. The law took effect on July 1, 2022; approximately six months before the FBI determines whether to terminate the program due to lack of participation.

3.4 Policy and Use of Force Maps

Policy count maps

Maps were created using self-reported FDLE violent incident data and compiled data on the presence and absence of policies collected from responding jurisdictions (Figures 3 and 4). Separate maps were made for police departments and Sheriff’s offices to show the differences
between the types of jurisdictions (and their overlapping geographies). No geographic trends were found from either the Police Department (Figure 3) or Sheriff’s Office (Figure 4) maps. Maps showing the presence or absence of the Warn Before Shooting policy and the number of reported violent incidents for police departments and Sheriff’s offices can be seen in Figures 5 and 6. Maps showing the presence and absence of each of the other seven 8 Can’t Wait policies and the number of self-reported violent incidents can be found in Appendix 1.
Figure 3. Number of violent incidents reported by police departments in Florida along with the total number of 8 Can’t Wait initiative’s suggested policies. Darker purple areas are jurisdictions with more policies implemented and gray areas are jurisdictions no policies were collected from. Data obtained from Florida Department of Law Enforcement Use of Force database through a public records request, publicly available data from Mapping Police Violence and Washington Post Use of Force databases, and a policy scan of responding Florida jurisdictions’ Use of Force/Response to Resistance policies.
Figure 4. Number of violent incidents reported by Sheriff’s offices in Florida along with the total number of Campaign Zero’s suggested policies. Darker purple areas are jurisdictions with more policies implemented and gray areas are jurisdictions no policies were collected from. Data obtained from Florida Department of Law Enforcement Use of Force database through a public records request, publicly available data from Mapping Police Violence and Washington Post Use of Force databases, and a policy scan of responding Florida jurisdictions’ Use of Force/Response to Resistance policies.
Figure 5. Number of violent incidents reported by municipal police departments in Florida along with the presence/absence of the police to warn suspects before shooting at them. Green jurisdictions indicate the policy's presence, while yellow areas are jurisdictions without the policy implemented. Gray areas are jurisdictions no policies were collected from. Data obtained from Florida Department of Law Enforcement Use of Force database through a public records request, publicly available data from Mapping Police Violence and Washington Post Use of Force databases, and a policy scan of responding Florida jurisdictions’ Use of Force/Response to Resistance policies.
Figure 6. Number of violent incidents reported by Sheriff’s offices in Florida along with the presence/absence of the police to warn suspects before shooting at them. Green jurisdictions indicate the policy’s presence, while yellow areas are jurisdictions without the policy implemented. Gray areas are jurisdictions no policies were collected from. Data obtained from Florida Department of Law Enforcement Use of Force database through a public records request, publicly available data from Mapping Police Violence and Washington Post Use of Force databases, and a policy scan of responding Florida jurisdictions’ Use of Force/Response to Resistance policies.

Incident Dashboard

The dashboard was created with three windows: two windows displaying different statistics from the violent incident reported by media sources (the top left window), the percentage of jurisdictions implementing different numbers of the eight 8 Can’t Wait policies (the bottom left window), and a map displaying the incidents and a feature of the Florida jurisdictions (the right window). Each window can be resized by moving the dividing bar between one window and another, and each window can be made full screen by clicking the icon in the top right corner of that window; to
return the window to its non-full screen size, click the icon in the top right corner again. The dashboard can be found at this URL:

https://www.arcgis.com/apps/dashboards/0bed1992fe4a4201aef00d63a460e3db (Figure 7).

To display different maps and charts, the user can click on the name of the maps/charts in the window. Alternatively, the user can cycle through the maps/charts by clicking the arrows to the left and right of the name of the map/chart. The maps display the presence of jurisdictional policies, proportions of jurisdictions’ populations that are white and that are black, and violent incidents reported by media outlets only (i.e., the Washington Post and Mapping Police Violence databases) as the self-reported FDLE data do not include addresses, coordinates, or any other way to geolocate the incident. The incidents are displayed as red dots, and the jurisdictions show different statistics of that jurisdiction. Jurisdiction population features (e.g., population size, percentage of households earning within income ranges, percentage of residents that are within certain age ranges) and jurisdictional features (e.g., presence/absence of Campaign Zero policies, total number of these policies, and violent incident reports per capita) are included as information, which requires clicking on a jurisdiction in the map.

To quickly determine what a chart is displaying the user can simply hover over an element in a chart. Making the cursor hover over any item in a chart will display the category or value of what is being displayed. For example, making the cursor hover over the ninth bar from the right (between the bars for “brick” and “gun and car”) shows that bar is for the category “cologne” and the popup will display that there was one incident where cologne was the weapon a subject was armed with.
Figure 7. Display of the ArcGIS Online dashboard displaying the basic layout created using data obtained through the Can 8 Wait? project. The top left window contains different statistics from the incident data, including whether the suspect was armed showed, showed signs of mental health issues, threatened officers, was fleeing, demographics (i.e., race and sex) of the subject, and whether the incident was recorded with cameras. The bottom left window contains a pie chart that shows the percentage of jurisdictions that have implemented any number of 8 Can’t Wait policies. The window on the left contains the maps made for this project, which includes the location and information for each incident recorded by the media and various visualizations of select features of each jurisdiction. The features selected for display are whether the 8 Can’t Wait policies are implemented (a map for each of the eight 8 Can’t Wait policies), the total number of 8 Can’t Wait policies implemented per jurisdiction, and one map each showing the proportion of the jurisdiction’s population that is white and black. Data obtained from Florida Department of Law Enforcement Use of Force database through a public records request, publicly available data from Mapping Police Violence and Washington Post Use of Force databases, and a policy scan of responding Florida jurisdictions’ Use of Force/Response to Resistance policies.

The windows are connected and will show filtered data based on selections of categories or values in other windows. For example, if you wanted to see the jurisdictions that have implemented five of the eight 8 Can’t Wait policies and the incidents where the subject was armed with a gun, you would click on the portion of the pie chart in the bottom left window that indicates eight of the 8 Can’t Wait policies being implemented and the large bar in the top left window indicating gun armed suspects. This selection is demonstrated in Figure 8. Multiple categories or values can be
selected from a window – click on a second category after the first has been selected. To deselect categories, click on the element for the selected category again once it has been selected.

**Figure 8.** An image of the Can 8 Wait? dashboard with only jurisdictions with five of the 8 Can’t Wait policies implemented and only the violent incidents where the suspect was armed with a gun are selected to be shown. Data obtained from Florida Department of Law Enforcement Use of Force database through a public records request, publicly available data from Mapping Police Violence and Washington Post Use of Force databases, and a policy scan of responding Florida jurisdictions’ Use of Force/Response to Resistance policies.

![Can 8 Wait? Dashboard](image)

Additionally, selecting one of the responses in the top left window will filter all the other displayed statistics in the top left window. For example, Figures 9 through 12 display the process of showing the difference in all weapons present during violent incidents and the weapons suspects were armed with only when attacking officers (by selecting the portion of the pie chart indicating the suspect was attacking officers).

**Figure 9.** The full-screen display of the pie chart showing whether the subject was a threat to officers. No category is selected. Data obtained from Florida Department of Law Enforcement Use of Force database through a public records request, publicly available data from Mapping Police Violence and Washington Post Use of Force databases, and a policy scan of responding Florida jurisdictions’ Use of Force/Response to Resistance policies.
Figure 10. The full-screen display of the bar chart showing all objects used by subjects during a violent incident with law enforcement officers. No threat category has been selected. Data obtained from Florida Department of Law Enforcement Use of Force database through a public records request, publicly available data from Mapping Police Violence and Washington Post Use of Force databases, and a policy scan of responding Florida jurisdictions’ Use of Force/Response to Resistance policies.
**Figure 11.** The full screen display of the pie chart indicating whether and how the subject was threatening law enforcement officers. The attack category has been selected. Data obtained from Florida Department of Law Enforcement Use of Force database through a public records request, publicly available data from Mapping Police Violence and Washington Post Use of Force databases, and a policy scan of responding Florida jurisdictions’ Use of Force/Response to Resistance policies.

![Figure 11](image1)

**Figure 12.** The full-screen display of weapons used by suspects during violent incidents involving law enforcement officers. The attack category in the “was the subject a threat?” window was selected. Data obtained from Florida Department of Law Enforcement Use of Force database through a public records request, publicly available data from Mapping Police Violence and Washington Post Use of Force databases, and a policy scan of responding Florida jurisdictions’ Use of Force/Response to Resistance policies.

![Figure 12](image2)
Filtering categories based on selections made in the map is not possible - something ESRI (the creators of the software) have not yet allowed. Selecting a violent incident point will display recorded aspects of that incident and clicking a jurisdiction polygon will open a window that displays the variables used in the statistical analysis discussed above. The variables displayed are: the total population of the jurisdiction; the proportion of the population identifying as a particular race; the proportion of the population within age groups; the proportion of households within income brackets; the proportion of housing unit vacant; the proportion of housing units rented; the proportion of housing units in value categories (e.g., $10,000 through $14,999, inclusive); the proportion of rented housing units within rental rate categories; the presence/absence of the eight 8 Can’t Wait policies; the total number of 8 Can’t Wait policies; and the count and per capita rate of violent incidents reported by Florida jurisdictions, media databases, and both.

3.5 Data suggestions

Improving the self-reported data collected by the FDLE to submit to the FBI Use-of-Force database is necessary. Based on the data already obtained, models show a statistically significant, but very low impact of demographic factors on reported violent incidents, potentially because of the low number of reports. However, these relationships may not be repeated in other reporting jurisdictions with better data. It was previously discussed how few self-reported use of force incidents Florida has in comparison to other, smaller jurisdictions including Dallas, TX and Indianapolis, Indiana. Additional comparison between Florida Use of Force data and Indianapolis Use of Force data expose other potential gaps in Use of Force data collected by FDLE.

Force categories
The profound difference between Florida and Indianapolis Use of Force data are the types of use of force reported. Florida jurisdictions report broad categories of force used; see Table 5 for the number of force categories and number of times each category was reported. In addition to not being broad, some categories are not clearly defined; for example, there are 129 reports of firearm usage and 2 “projectile” usage, with no definitions to distinguish two force categories. The category “chemical” is not broken up into sub-categories for the different types of chemical force available. Each category has only one description, for example the only description for the category “physical” is “hands-feet-fist”, which does not completely describe the breadth of different physical forces potentially used or the exact type of physical force used.

Table 5. Types of force and the number of times the category was reported to FDLE in Use of Force data. Data obtained from Florida Department of Law Enforcement Use of Force database obtained through a public records request.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Force</th>
<th>Times Reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canine</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearm</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projectile</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indianapolis, on the other hand, requires the reporting of every type of force used, including handcuffing and the use of body weight as leverage (20,851 and 26,705 reports, respectively); see Table 6 for the complete list of categories used and the number of times each was reported in 2019.
by Indianapolis jurisdictions. One of the more interesting aspects of this data is that it includes incidents where handcuffing was used in the arrest of a suspect with no other force used. There are a total of 48 different categories of force reported by Indianapolis jurisdictions, six times the number of categories reported by Florida jurisdictions. While many of the Indianapolis categories are self-explanatory, a few include abbreviations that are not explained.

Table 6. Use of force categories used by Indianapolis jurisdictions and the number of times they were reported in 2019. The first Use of Force category is blank, corresponding to where this field was left blank in the report. Obtained from the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Open Indy Portal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use of Force Categories</th>
<th>Times Reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baton</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bean Bag</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body Weight Leverage</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canine bite</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canine Bite</td>
<td>1855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS Fogger</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handcuffing</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handgun</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hands, Fist, Feet</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Manipulation</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Lethal-Baton</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Lethal-Bean Bag</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Lethal-BolaWrap</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Lethal-BPS Gas</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon Type</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Lethal-Burning CS</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Lethal-Clearout OC</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Lethal-CS Foger</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Lethal-CS Grenade</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Lethal-CS/OC</td>
<td>2670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Lethal-Flash Bang</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Lethal-Leg Sweep</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Lethal-Other</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Lethal-Pepperball</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Lethal-Taser</td>
<td>7183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal-Handgun</td>
<td>1341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal-Knife</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal-Rifle</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal-Shotgun</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal-Vehicle</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Impact Weapon</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pepper Ball</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal CS/OC spray</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical-Elbow Strike</td>
<td>952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical-Fist Strike</td>
<td>5184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical-Handcuffing</td>
<td>20851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical-Joint/Pressure</td>
<td>8105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical-Kick</td>
<td>1142</td>
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<tr>
<td>Physical-Knee Strike</td>
<td>4908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical-Leg Sweep</td>
<td>4604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical-Other</td>
<td>9422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical-Palm Strike</td>
<td>1866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical-Push</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical-Take Down</td>
<td>14039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical-Weight Leverage</td>
<td>26705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointing a Firearm</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taser</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Data types**

Florida Use of Force data was obtained in a format that prevented any direct spatial analysis. Indianapolis (under Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department General Order 1.31) and Dallas (under Texas State Code Article 2.139) both provide data that can be used in spatial analysis: Indianapolis by geolocating the addresses included in the data and the Dallas data is provided as spatial data (i.e., already geolocated). Lacking this geographic information in Florida prevents further analysis based solely on location and the potential identification of neighborhood “hotspots” that may need different types of law enforcement or governmental services by non-law enforcement analysts.

Beyond not including the spatial aspect of these incidents, Florida Use of Force reports contain only jurisdictional information (i.e., the jurisdictions’ name) while other jurisdictions include breakdowns of the agency, locational, and temporal aspects of the jurisdiction (i.e., agency’s division, jurisdiction’s district, and shift of the responding officer(s)). In addition to lacking the breakdown of the agency, geography, and shift where/when the incident occurred, the Florida Use of Force data does not include any arrest information regarding the suspect, though it does include
what the outcome of the force was (e.g., gunshot, other serious injury, and death), unlike other jurisdictions.

Some of the data categories from both Indianapolis and Florida jurisdictions combine data categories that are separated in media data. For example, in the reported data, “fleeing” was reported as a type of resisting on the subject’s part (alongside being aggressive, non-compliance, and attacking officers) instead of being a category all its own. While this may be a standard put forth by the FBI, whether a suspect was fleeing should be entered separately to whether and how a suspect was being aggressive.

Including the above categories of data in what is collected will allow additional analysis showing where (and when) additional resources are needed, as well as show a willingness to be transparent with the community.

Availability and usability of data

For law enforcement agencies to be transparent, Use of Force and other data need to be readily available to the public. Unfortunately, obtaining the Florida Use of Force data required a public records request to be submitted to the FDLE. Beyond the need to submit a public records request, the time it takes to return the requested data can be a barrier to transparency. The initial request was submitted on January 24, 2022, and clarifications requested were submitted on February 1, 2022. The data was finalized and delivered on March 3, 2022, five weeks later. Contrast this to Indianapolis (https://data.indy.gov/datasets/IndyGIS::impd-use-of-force/explore) and Dallas (https://www.dallasopendata.com/browse?tags=use+of+force) Use of Force data, where the
dataset is available for public download on the respective city’s webpage. It is understandable that FDLE has specific regulations and policies all public records requests must meet, but additional resources should be obtained to either set up a publicly accessible database or increase the speed of public records production.

Data format
In addition to readily available or promptly produced data, the formatting of the data does not indicate a willingness to be transparent. The data was produced in eight PDF files corresponding to the eight use of force tables used to collect these reports and one PDF file listing each monthly “Zero Report” (i.e., a report of zero incidents) for all reporting jurisdictions since the jurisdiction started reporting. To use these data, they needed to be converted to Excel files, which is what was done here.

Missing data
Regarding the data itself, there are many missing pieces of information. Table 7 shows the column names from the Use of Force data obtained from the FDLE along with the number of records that contain an empty (i.e., “NA” or “Null” value”). These are cells where nothing was ever entered into the database. There are additional cells that are “empty” but contain a zero-length string of text, which is functionally the same, but needs to be treated differently in data analysis. While 184 incidents were reported to FDLE there are 518 records in the database. This is because databases store multiple values from one incident as multiple records for that incident (i.e., a single incident will be repeated multiple times to cover all entries for a single field). The number of empty records ranges from 0 to 451. The table describing the subject in each incident contains 374 empty cells
for many of the columns. The maximum value of 451 empty cells is in the column named “x”; it is unknown what information this column is supposed to contain.

**Table 7.** The column names of the Use of Force data obtained from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and number of empty cells for each column. Empty cells are defined as a cell with no text and classified as “NA” or “Null”. This does not include cells containing text with a length of zero (e.g., the text was deleted). Data obtained from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement Use of Force database obtained through a public records request.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column Name</th>
<th>Number of NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UOF_ID</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT.TYPE</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBMITAGENCY</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDATE</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOFF</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOFFREP</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCSUBINJ</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITCONT</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEOAPPROACH</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCATIONT</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITY</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE.CODE</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT_SEQUENCE_NUMBER</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORCE_CODE</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORCE_CODE_DESCRIPTION</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSON_ROLE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSON_SEQUENCE_NUMBER</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leoAGE</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leoETHNICITY</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leoRACE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leoSEX</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEO_INJURY_CODE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCHARGE_FIREARM_CODE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENFORCEMENT_OFFICIAL_INJ_INC_NUM</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENFORCEMENT_OFFICIAL_READILY_IDE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INJURED_CODE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONDUTY_CODE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEARS_OF_SERV_CE_TOTAL</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFFENSE_SEQUENCE_NUMBER</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFFENSE_DESCRIPTION</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT_RESISTED_CODE</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subject</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>influence</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCIDENT_RESULT</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Font issues*

For the cells that contain information, there are instances in the PDF files where each occurrence of certain letters is missing. For example, the term “Sheriff's Office” reads as “She ff’s O f ce” in
the PDF files received from FDLE. While the letters “i”, “f”, and “r” are not consistently missing from all columns, where they are missing, it can be difficult to determine what the text should be. Likewise, the colon in the time that the incident occurred is missing, making the datetime column unusable without extensively updating the data. It is unknown whether the data in the database has these missing characters or if they are an artifact of converting the database into PDF files.

Incomplete data

In addition to the information that doesn’t include all letters and columns without information in many of the cells, there is also one instance of a pending investigation being reported. It is promising that incidents are reported when they happen (or soon after), however it is unknown if or how any updates to existing data can or will occur. It is understood that there are limitations on what data can be included in the Use of Force database, additional information should be available that explains incident update procedures.

Final suggestions

Based on the data obtained, there are multiple suggestions for how to better collect, maintain, and disseminate Use of Force data. First, more data should be collected from additional jurisdictions as well as including expanded types of use of force incidents. Second, additional information should be collected including the district, agency division, and shift (when applicable to that jurisdiction), the spatial component of the incident, and include separate categories for when suspects flee and whether or not the suspect was aggressive. Third, the data should be readily accessible by the public in file formats that are easily usable (e.g., .xls, .xlsx, or .csv). Fourth, data should be complete (i.e., no missing information), with all letters in the information present. Fifth
there should be additional information presented to the public on update policies and definitions for all abbreviations.
4.0 Interview Findings

4.1 Overview

To add experiential knowledge of policy implementation issues to our study, we invited representatives of the leadership of the 65 departments to participate in interviews examining their perspectives on police use of force policies. Through the interviews, we solicited their perspectives on the effectiveness or feasibility of each of the eight policies currently at the center of discussion around reforming police use of force policies, as well as whether they believe other important policies are missing from this conversation. We inquired into their understanding of the circumstances that influence police use of force in their jurisdiction. We also examined how often use of force training is necessary and effective, how they investigate use of force incidents, and how they ensure policy compliance. We explored how they conduct policy review and change processes, and what role they perceived the public plays in these processes. Finally, we asked why they decided to participate in reporting use of force data to the FBI. These interviews provide more nuance in understanding issues surrounding use of force and context to interpret our analysis.

We wrote letters inviting each of the identified departments to participate in our interview research, following up twice with repeated email requests after a period of two weeks. As a result of our requests, we were able to conduct 12 interviews via Zoom, and we received two sets of written responses to our interview questions, representing six jurisdictions. Nine jurisdictions responded that they were unwilling to participate in our research, while the remainder failed to respond to our solicitations. Our interviews were predominantly with police department leadership, which allowed for quite a comprehensive discussion on use of force from the perspective of police leaders. While this was especially useful in understanding the broader policy environment, there
were also limitations to police leadership responses in understanding conditions on the ground. Interviewing police officers as opposed to departmental leadership might have provided different insight on use of force incidents and interactions of police officers with the public.

The interviews ranged from approximately 30 to 60 minutes, and were divided into four sections. After a few general questions, the interviews explored each of the eight police use of force policies that have been highlighted in the national conversation in recent years: (1) requiring de-escalation; (2) having a use-of-force continuum; (3) banning chokeholds; (4) issuing warnings prior to shooting; (5) banning shooting at moving vehicles; (6) exhausting all alternatives prior to the use of force; (7) intervening if another officer is using excessive force; and (8) comprehensive reporting. As each agency is responsible for adopting its own policies as appropriate, the interviews explored these recommended policies individually by examining each agency’s approach to a specific policy and views of its benefits and constraints. The second section of the interview explored the circumstances that surround police use of force, and how or why these circumstances were important factors to consider in officers’ decision-making around use of force. The third section of the interview addressed policy implementation and reform. The interview concluded by discussing policy recommendations. We conducted all interviews through Zoom and used the transcription feature in Zoom to document all interviews.

Subsequently, two members of the research team used Dedoose software to qualitatively code interview transcriptions. This generated 50 descriptive codes within our interviews. We used these descriptive codes to organize our interview findings across five broad themes, including: (a) perspectives on use of 8Can’tWait policies; (b) public-facing perspectives; (c) circumstances
surrounding the use of force; (d) views on the general policy environment, and (e) police agencies relationships with the public. We included a further breakdown of these four themes to illustrate detailed aspects of police officers’ experiences and relationships with the public.

The key findings of our qualitative research provide important context to our study. Among the key eight policies at the heart of recent discussions of police use of force, police leaders were emphatic on the importance of reiterating a duty to intervene to decrease use of force incidents. Many police leaders also agreed with the “spirit” of many the use of force policies proposed in the 8Can’tWait campaign, but expressed concerns that these could not be applied universally. In their view, using de-escalation tactics and providing warning prior to shoot should only be implemented when practical, and bans on the use of chokeholds and strangleholds and shooting at moving vehicles should have exceptions for deadly force situations. Interviews highlighted the ways that police leaders seek to assure the public of their commitment to public safety, promoting what they believed to be positive aspects of their agency and officers and shifting attention from recent controversies around policing. Discussing the circumstances that influence use of force, police leaders particularly emphasized the importance of officer experience. Discussing the policy development and reform processes, police leaders described how they learned from other agencies and organizations, as well as mistakes. Finally, police leaders also acknowledged that there were often strained relationships between their agency and communities of color, stressing the steps they were taking to engage the community and build trust.

Examining interview responses in this section, we discuss the four major themes that arose in our analysis. First, we address how police leaders responded to the key eight policies at the heart of
recent discussions of police use of force. Second, we review how leaders highlighted the ways that police seek to assure the public of their commitment to public safety while also recognizing the need to build public trust in the police, particularly among communities of color. Third, we turn to how police leaders discussed various circumstances that may influence the use of force. Fourth, we discuss the insights of police leaders on the policy development and reform process. Finally, we close with a discussion of police agencies relationships to the public.

4.2 Police Perspectives on Current Use of 8 Can’t Wait Policies

In this section, we review how police leaders responded to the eight police use of force advocated by the 8Can’tWait campaign. Here they provide important context that informs policy implementation and reflections on the utility and feasibility of different policies. Reviewing these eight policies, we order the policies in accordance with their frequency of adoption from our policy scan: (1) ensuring comprehensive reporting, (2) exhausting alternative reasonable means prior to using deadly force, (3) banning shooting at moving vehicles, (4) employing a use of force continuum, (5) requiring de-escalation, (6) banning the use of chokeholds and strangleholds, (7) establishing a duty to intervene, and (8) warning prior to shooting.

Comprehensive Reporting

In the qualitative research, police officials echoed the policy emphasis on comprehensive internal reporting. Officials who participated in the research had detailed knowledge of their internal reporting requirements, although the particularities of these processes varied depending on the specifics of agency policy. The interviews particularly stressed the importance of contextualizing incidents of use of force. While our research targeted agencies participating in federal reporting of
use of force incidents, leadership’s knowledge of external federal reporting was notably less detailed and included far less data.

The officials described how their reporting requirements involved extensive collection of incident details associated with any use of force incident. As described in one interview, the police collected the details of “who, what, where, when, why, how with as much evidence as we possibly can, including the deputies body camera footage.” This information is combined with incident reports that are then systematically reviewed following the chain of command and referred to Internal Affairs when appropriate. Internal reporting on use of force was typically described as comprehensive, including any response to subject resistance that required application of force. An official described the tracking of use of force as including every incident in which more than guiding touch was applied:

*We don’t report what we call like an escort. ... we may do what we call a guiding touch where we put our hand on your shoulder or we grab the back of your arm and your wrist and kind of walk you out. As long as there’s no act of resistance on the part of the person that we’re escorting, those aren’t documented. ... Display or usage, any use or display of the firearm ... any of our firearms, whether it be rifle, shotgun, or handgun; obviously any physical control, where we actually take somebody to the ground, and we do an armbar or wrist lock, you know, those kind of things; any encounter that occurs during handcuffing, all of those are documented. ... We make sure officers understand that anytime ... that force ... more than just, you know, again, a guiding touch that they're ... recorded. So we do that for all physical encounters.*

Another official described that the response to resistance reporting included “everything from a motor vehicle crash to deadly force. […] You make an arrest … and the bad guy says, ‘the handcuffs are on too tight and it caught up my circulation’ – that's a use of force, it has to be investigated.”
Moreover, the use of police management software enabled police leadership to effectively track patterns in the use of force and compile internal statistics on such incidents. This allowed police officials to identify issues with use of force. For internal police management, one official stressed that “comprehensive reporting is important [because it] allows us to look at individual officers, and if you know, if certain markers are hit … then warnings are sent to us, and we can look at those.” However, the official also stressed the necessity of contextualizing data. For instance, they explained that if an officer was involved in dozens of use of force incidents in a year, this may signal that “something's wrong with that officer and that officer needs to be put on EAP, [or] early warning,” or it could reflect the nature of the officer’s work, such as vice detail where “they do three search warrants a week [of] drug houses and other things,” which may require the drawing of a weapon. Ultimately, evaluations of officers need to account for context.

While internal tracking of use of force was comprehensive, participation in federal reporting of use of force statistics was far less so. One official stated that “as far as reporting federally speaking, I think the only thing that we report is death.” Officials explained their decision to participate in reporting to the federal database as an important form of public transparency. However, some officials explained that data sharing should be done carefully to avoid decontextualizing the data:

*We want to be as transparent as we possibly can be, but you have to be very careful and make sure ... the data that you're putting out ... that people understand. Depending on where an officer works, they’re going to have different types of interactions. [If] they're in a high crime area, they're going to have more use of force typically ... than in a low crime area, where that person may have more traffic stops. ... I don’t mind sharing that with the public ... what we’re going to share that with the public, but there just has to be that understanding that that raw data ... you can't just take that and make carte blanche conclusions.*

Each police agency interpreted what was appropriate to share with the federal use of force database. There was no standard response regarding the specific information that should be shared.
In contrast to internal reporting policies, officials expressed uncertainty about what information they cataloged in the federal database or who was responsible for it. Noting the issues this created and the difficulty comparing across jurisdictions in the federally reported data, one interviewee explained that “there should be a good transparent nationwide standard for how forces [report] to ensure that everybody's doing it the same.”

Exhausting All Alternatives

When discussing the proposed policy of exhausting all alternatives before using force, police officials expressed a range of concerns. Responses about this issue varied from straightforward endorsement of this policy goal to equivocation on the meaning of exhausting reasonable alternatives. While the principle of using only the amount of force objectively reasonable to bring the incident under control guided the majority of police use of force policies, leaders were far from unanimous regarding this recommended policy. Some leaders expressed substantial concerns around the policy goal of exhausting alternative reasonable means before resorting to deadly force.

Several officials emphasized the importance of minimizing the use of force when facing resistance. Echoing the terms of the recommended policy, one official simply stated, “you should start with the lowest level of force necessary and only use that physical force as a last resort.” While use of force policies regularly stress the use of minimal force as a guiding principle, the officials we interview often expressed how there are challenges to meaningfully implementing this policy. For example, one official stated:

*That one’s very difficult because ... what do you mean by exhausting alternatives? There’s a lot of different interpretations as to when you get into types of force. Would you rather ... an officer strike somebody ... if it was objectively reasonable with a baton? Utilize a taser? Use pepper spray? ... A closed fist? What
would be a lesser alternative in those [situations]? How could you rank those? They’re basically equal applications of force. ... So I don't think that’s very good verbiage. I think it’s very difficult to put in a policy and implement.

Thus, one of the factors that police officials flagged as a difficulty in this policy area was the ambiguity of what constitutes exhausting all alternatives. Some officials also explained the difficulties officers may have in assessing the reasonable minimum use of force and what constitutes viable alternatives within a dynamic and quickly unfolding situation. According to another official:

_I think that [exhausting all reasonable alternatives] always should be a consideration. Those alternatives, however, may not always exist, dependent upon the urgency of the situation. ... If we have time on our side ... having a show of force potentially may be better than automatically reacting to something with the same level of force. ... So, again, in most cases, absolutely, we should ... make every effort that they exhaust [alternatives]. ... But some cases, the urgency of what is presented is not going to allow you to do that._

Based on the officials’ responses, although this policy principle has the goal of minimizing force and exhausting all reasonable alternatives prior to the use of force, the exigencies of police work can often make implementation of this policy challenging.

**Bans on Shooting at Moving Vehicles**

With regard to bans on shooting at moving vehicles, police leadership divided between those who emphasized the logic of such policies and those who emphasized the circumstances that made a complete ban unfeasible. Police leaders agreed that shooting at moving vehicles was undesirable and should be generally avoided. However, several officials expressed concerns that a ban could not be applied universally.
Explaining the importance of such a ban, officials stressed its need “for safety purposes [to prevent] anyone else from getting harmed by the moving vehicle.” Although they mentioned that shooting at a moving vehicle could be an option, officials also noted the difficulty of successfully shooting someone in a moving vehicle and the relatively high likelihood of missing and increasing the risk of injuring bystanders. Potential injuries to others may also occur if the driver of a moving vehicle is shot and an out-of-control vehicle careens down the street. These leaders thus stressed the ineffectiveness and danger of allowing officers to shoot at vehicles in any circumstances other than those in which deadly force is warranted to protect life.

Several responses, however, turned back to emphasizing that shooting at moving vehicles is rational in certain circumstances. For instance, one official stated, “if you talk about a complete ban, I would be opposed to it. Our [policy] says that [doing so] is strongly discouraged.” Others described potential situations that this action would be necessary.

So, someone is driving a car through a crowd and I had the opportunity to maybe close in and fire shots at that driver through the window. ... In an effort to stop them driving through a crowd ... that's my only option to stop that car and save innocent people from getting run over. ... I certainly would hate to see that as a policy violation because we've been shooting at moving vehicles. Again, I think it has to be objectively reasonable for this specific situation. ... In general, it's probably not a good idea, but there are situations where it is certainly warranted.

Focusing on such exceptional circumstances, these officials rationalized the need for language that discouraged rather than banned firing at moving vehicles.

**Use of Force Continuum**

Police leadership identified a number of different policy instruments that delineated stages and considerations for the escalation of force. While some used a Use of Force Continuum that provided clear stages of escalating subject resistance and corresponding appropriate levels of force,
others preferred a more contextual Critical Decision-Making Model that emphasizes the need to focus on the totality of circumstances to determine an objectively reasonable response. In the interviews, officials explained the rationale informing their use of these different instruments.

One official described their agency using “a continuum, which is a [training] guideline to allow officers to understand what on an average objective reasonableness would be.” Another response including the following:

*One of the very first day one items that we were taught [is that] your use of force ... must match ... the force that is ... being applied on you. ... There it says explicitly in our policy, the use of excessive force will not be tolerated. ... That's in big bold letters. So that use of force continuum is absolutely alive and well in our policy.*

One official leader compared the continuum to other models, which require evaluating the totality of circumstances, and explained their preference: “That continuum offers a little bit [more] of a workflow. ... So that continuum seems to work better both with new hires as well as our own staff.”

However, other leaders preferred a policy that provided greater flexibility and nuance in decision-making, and “allows for reasonable limits of discretion.” An official stated that a more contextual decision-making approach oriented to broader policy goals was preferable to the ironclad if-then logic of continuums.

*It provides guideposts as opposed to checkboxes, right? A checkbox means we have to hit this step, we have to hit this step, we have to hit this step. And if this step occurs ... you have to then necessarily go into this corresponding response. A guidepost provides the overarching goal, which is to resolve the incident in a legal, ethical, and moral manner using the minimum force necessary. And these are things that you need to look for along that path, they could indicate that greater or lesser use of force options are needing to be considered and implemented.*
Police officials argued that strict adherence to a continuum risked missing contextual factors, which could lead to the potential misapplication of force. One official used a hypothetical situation to illustrate the problems of a continuum approach and need for a model that accounts for the context that informs critical decision-making:

One of the examples that we frequently use is: If somebody pulls a knife on you, can you shoot them? ... Yes, absolutely. And then you add context to that scenario, a kindergarten student in a public school cafeteria holding a plastic knife. ... If we were to use a continuum that says when they pull a knife on you shoot them ... we've lost something potentially. Whereas a decision-making matrix that evaluates what's the level, and corresponding level of response allows us to create a little bit more context and provide texture into that conversation. ... Anything that locks somebody into a guaranteed course of action, regardless of circumstances [is] inappropriate for a law enforcement environment.

Thus, many police leaders stressed the need for contextual understanding of response of resistance, eschewing a continuum that equates a level of resistance to a corresponding level of response.

Following the logic of jurisprudence (Graham v. Connor, 1989), many police agencies have shifted to a Critical Decision-Making Model that emphasizes the need to focus on the totality of circumstances to determine an objectively reasonable response. As one official leader explained, “we’ve gone to the objectively reasonable standard where you judge something very situationally based on the specific facts and circumstances of that incident and not on a generic step-by-step matrix. So I’m opposed to a matrix.” Like older policies, the Critical Decision-Making Model approach relies on an escalating set of responses to resistance, but it encourages nuanced decision-making with regard to subjective factors. Police leaders advocating for the critical decision-making model argued that this was an effective response to recent court cases. One response included the following: “the more progressive agencies are moving away from an actual chart, or a continuum. … we all know that in use of force incidents, there are no absolutes, and although the continuum was never meant or intended to be, a lot of [defense attorneys] were trying to use it as such.”
De-Escalation

Police leadership generally supported the use of de-escalation tactics when feasible, but were divided with respect to the value of de-escalation policies. Some officials stressed how effectively de-escalation tactics could defuse situations and reduce the need for use of force. Others, however, stressed the tactical difficulties associated with such an approach.

One official explained the utility and importance of training police officers in “techniques to ensure that our interactions with our residents do not provoke a situation to escalate when sometimes simple respect and patience will help things calm down.” Another official stressed that “the first thing in our general guidelines and our policy [says] we should attempt to control a situation using verbal de-escalation.” Advocates of de-escalation policies regularly emphasized the importance of “trying to get [officers] … out the mindset of the escalating situations,” developing a culture that emphasizes strategies for the peaceful resolution of situations. Instead of simply escalating use of force in response to resistance, de-escalation tactics look for opportunities to step back, “creating distance … allowing more time for other resources … other people.”

Other officials emphasized the need to avoid over-generalizing the utility of de-escalation tactics. For instance, one official cautioned that “it does take two to de-escalate and not all situations [make that] an appropriate tactic. … People have to understand that it is not something that can be done in every situation.” Echoing these views, another official said:

_Not every situation [is] conducive to de-escalation. I don’t believe that when somebody is on the verge of stabbing someone, for example, that we need to sit there and … plan a 20- minute philosophical discussion [on] treatment of their fellow … man or woman. [You] just have to take swift action to preserve life, as we’re tasked to do under the statutes and … as part of our sworn oath to protect the [public]._
In these interviews, officials emphasized the primary importance of preserving life, by means that are in line with the situation, suggesting the need to include limitations to the general de-escalation policy.

**Duty to Intervene**

In our interviews with police officials, they were unanimous about the expectation that officers have a duty to intervene if another officer is using excessive force. One interviewee was unequivocal on this duty: “I think that’s an absolute requirement. [The] last time I checked, the duty of [an officer] to protect and defend the citizens … does not stop when they’re being victimized by fellow [officers].” Another explained that if an officer witnesses unnecessary escalation, “we want that officer to step in and resolve the situation before it becomes a problem.”

One official elaborated on how their broader policy context supported the duty to intervene:

> [The policy] states that all members must recognize and act upon the duty to intervene to prevent or stop any member from the use of excessive force. ... The intervention may be verbal and or physical. And then members must immediately notify their supervisor after conducting any type of intervention when it's safe to do so. And it further provides that failure to intervene ... subjects a member to disciplinary action pursuant to our general orders that cover misconduct and disciplinary investigations.

The effectiveness of a policy around the duty to intervene was linked to the importance of training officers on it. Several officers were explicit in their recommendation that officer preparation must focus on intervention to encourage officers to take action when they see “something that [is] immoral/unjust/illegal/against policy,” particularly following the murder of George Floyd, which re-emphasized the significance of having checks and balances on fellow officers.
One concern raised in the discussion of the duty to intervene was the importance of recognizing that sometimes officers are unable to intervene in complex and quickly unfolding situations. For instance, one official who concurred on the importance of the duty to intervene, noted that:

[The] duty to intervene should always, always exist. I think the only issue [is] that sometimes you don't recognize what another officer may be doing. I may be so focused on another threat that I don't recognize that somebody else is ... utilizing maybe excessive force. So, I think we have to recognize that an officer also may be focused on something [else].

While strongly supporting the duty to intervene, this official cautioned that the public needs to remember that officers’ knowledge and awareness of developing events can be partial and limited.

Bans on Chokeholds

In discussions of chokeholds and strangleholds, several police officials repeated the importance of significantly limiting their use, but believed that policies should allow their use in deadly force situations. For instance, one official stated that limiting this tactic has “been a policy of ours for quite some time as well. We've never allowed chokeholds unless it was a deadly force situation, same thing with stranglehold.” The majority of the officials continually noted the need to preserve the right for officers to use the technique in extreme circumstances. For example, one official stated, “our ban is not necessarily … a universal ban so much as it bans chokeholds in situations that fall below a deadly force situation. If you're fighting for your life, you have to have the ability to choke somebody.” As another official explained, “the caveat that a complete and total ban on chokehold and vascular neck restraint is likely not feasible or appropriate for law enforcement, because there may be situations where a law enforcement officer is being faced with deadly force being applied against them.” Overall, the officials noted that although past policy had permitted the use of vascular restraints, it is difficult to safely execute the technique. Furthermore, due to
high-profile incidents where someone was killed by the misapplication of the technique, such as Eric Garner in New York in 2014, it is appropriate to incorporate a (conditional) ban on vascular neck restraints into policy.

**Warn Before Shooting**

Finally, police leadership were divided on the adoption and implementation of policies requiring officers to give a verbal warning prior to shooting. Some adopted this policy while emphasizing the conditionality of it. Others disagreed with instituting a policy to issue verbal warnings.

Several interview participants supported the principle of warning before shooting, while recognizing that the policy should only apply in appropriate circumstances where it was feasible. One leader cautioned that “you have to be very careful in your wording of [warnings], because obviously, if time allows, and if the situation allows, then certainly.” Another official explained that instituting a policy of warning before shooting was an important element of getting their agency accredited: “One of the accreditation requirements is to, if feasible, provide a warning before shooting. … It’s something that we discuss and support [in annual] training.” Another official stated that their agency does “incorporate a verbal warning into our policy for OC [oleoresin capsicum] spray, for any less than lethal impact munitions that may be use, … and also for any deadly force that may be used, such as firing a weapon.” However, throughout the interviews, police leaders emphasized that such policies must include an exception for dynamic situations where issuing a verbal warning is not reasonable or feasible for an officer.
However, other officials indicated that the issues and ambiguities associated with the conditional use of warnings before shooting made it an inappropriate area to institute requirements. One official was particularly adamant in their disagreement with instituting a blanket policy to issue verbal warnings.

*I’m trying to think of the right word – absurd, … is where I sort of fall on that one. And I think that, again, in an ideal world … that is absolutely appropriate. But a requirement in all cases, to issue a verbal warning, completely bypasses the notion that you could have a sniper shot and a hostage situation or something like that. Or you could have something that is rapidly dynamic, where we’re in a room and we’re having what appears to be a decent conversation with somebody, and now they have reached for their gun … And I don’t think that it’s appropriate to require people to say things like, ‘Drop the gun, drop the gun.’ It takes time that could cost lives. And so, again, as a policy, I believe that the wording of it has to be appropriate, if reasonable.

Similarly, another official suggested that issuing verbal warnings was advisable “in an ideal perfect scenario,” but noted that “it’s never a perfect scenario when somebody has to use deadly force.” Other officials simply did not have an explicit policy around warnings.

**Concluding Observations on 8Can’tWait Policy Recommendations**

Through the qualitative research on the recommended 8Can’tWait policies, police officials articulated a range of views, from supporting to being concerned with the policies advanced in the campaign. Some interview participants viewed the 8Can’tWait policies as comprehensive. For instance, one official said:

*The components that we’ve spoken about so far are the main components to incorporate and include any use of force policy. … I don’t see that there’s anything [missing] from the discussion … I think it kind of comprehensively covers all of the important considerations in [use] of force.*

However, as discussed in detail above, other officials expressed reservations about some of the policy recommendations. Repeatedly, the police officials responding to the 8Can’tWait policies
mentioned the importance of context to the feasibility of these policies, and the implausibility of treating them as universals. Throughout the interviews, officials highlighted the depth of consideration that leadership put into use of force policies. According to one official, agencies’ policies “are constantly reviewed, updated, and they are enforced when needed.” The interviews also demonstrated the breadth of concerns that inform police use of force policies.

4.3 Public Facing Perspectives of Police Agencies

Police leaders regularly made efforts to promote what they believed to be positive aspects of their agency and officers, emphasizing the initiatives that they were using to restore public faith in policing. In the current sociopolitical climate, where there are prominent demands for police reform, accountability, and transparency, image management seemed to be a central concern of police leaders. Our analysis indicates that the police officials used particular rhetorical techniques to validate their tactics and policies in anticipation of critiques from non-practitioners such as legislators, policymakers, academics, and the general public (Craig & Blount-Hill, 2022). None of the police officials explicitly acknowledged institutional discrimination in police use of force.

Image Management

One prominent theme we noted in our analysis of the interviews was consistent appeals to the good character of police officers as well as the outstanding credentials of the agency. This suggests that concerns around image management likely informed how the officials responded to our interview questions. In the interviews, police leaders employed rhetorical techniques that served to validate their tactics and policies. As described in the academic literature, image management rhetoric is used to “excuse behavior, mitigate sanction, or support the correctness of a certain course of action” (Kappeler et al., 1998, p. 111). This form of justificatory rhetoric relies on actors asserting
“their good deeds or admirable character attributes … [which] they contend render them incapable of [wrongdoing]” (Bryant et al., p. 593). This appeal to character was evident in reference to agency certifications and awards, the exceptional agency quality and culture, transparency to the public, high quality hiring, agency progressiveness, and contrasts to other agencies with discrimination problems. Police officials regularly lauded their agency achievements. For instance, one official indicated:

*Our agency has been honored with the highest level of certification by the state of Florida and has received that recertification three times. That recertification is a compendium review of policies, procedures, performance, reporting, transparency, and (literally) thousands of other standards. We exceed them. We continue to exceed them.*

Similarly, another official stated that: “our officers are trained to perform various levels of triage and have won numerous life-saving awards.” These discourses worked to emphasize the distinguishing characteristics of the agency, highlighting its status and quality and, in effect, diminishing concerns about potential problems with that particular agency.

A second related rhetorical strategy emphasized the quality and culture of the police force. For instance, one respondent lauded, “The women and men of our agency are extraordinary – and they MUST be because of the trust we and our residents must have in them.” Another official explained that police use of force is not a concern because the agency established high standards for officers’ behavior: “as far as culture within the organization, you’ll see that the one that the [chief] has created [is] top notch. … I love the people I work with. I love the people that I work for.” This emphasis on the quality of the force appeared to divert from an acknowledgement of any possible problems with the use of force.
A third discursive frame that was based in image management highlighted the quality of agency hiring. One official explained: “We believe that good policing comes down to hiring good people, giving good people the training they need to do their jobs, then providing leadership and support to those people.” Thus, the official sought to distinguish the agency, and minimize potential concerns, based on its hiring and training practices.

A fourth rhetorical frame emphasizing the good character of the force involved appeals to agency progressiveness. One official explained that:

*We don’t wait for bad things to happen to change; we change proactively. And we don’t have anything to hide – we have citizens working shoulder to shoulder with the women and men of our police department every day. ... We are “People who care about People,” and we believe that reflects positively on the entire City.*

Similarly, another research participant emphasized: “We pride ourselves on being innovative and ahead of the curve when it comes to reform and implementation of policies.” These appeals to department progressiveness particularly served to differentiate their organization from those other departments that had issues with discrimination. As another example, one official said:

*I genuinely believe in the work that we do as law enforcement. ... I don’t believe that ... it is necessarily the same everywhere. Because I do believe that the [chief] has created an environment where we ... excel in areas that other organizations don’t value. ... That’s exhibited in everything we do.*

Here, the contrast was explicit, rendering the issue of discriminatory application of use of force as an issue elsewhere.

Finally, agencies sought to distinguish themselves based on their transparency practices. For instance, one official expressed confidence in agency legitimacy based on efforts to be transparent:
“I can talk very honestly and very plainly about what … we think and what we feel, because I believe that it’ll hold up under the scrutiny of the public.” Furthermore, another official stated:

_We made the effort last year, to turn all our policies outward, basically. So, they’re available to the community so that they can see any of our policies at … any given time. Policies are living documents. They are reviewed regularly and changed._

Likewise, this commitment to transparency was used to rationalize participation in reporting to the national database. As one official explained, “our agency has elected to report Response to Resistance incidents to the FBI database as another form of transparency.” This focus on transparency again minimized the statistical patterns that may exist in the data, as well as the selectivity and partiality of departmental reporting.

Collectively, their image-oriented responses served to minimize concerns around disparities in the use of force, and essentially bypassed a discussion on the possibility that individual officers could use force in a discriminatory manner.

**4.4 Agency Initiatives to Effectively Implement Use of Force Policies**

Alongside image management strategies, police representatives emphasized the initiatives that their agency took to decrease use of force and effectively implement their response to resistance policies. This included a focus on effective training, investigations into incidents, and practices to ensure policy compliance. In this part of the report, we review how police leaders emphasized the importance of implementing effective training, investigation, and disciplinary processes to ensure that departmental norms around use of force were established and upheld.
Use of Force Training

A strongly repeated theme in the interviews was a focus on the significance of providing training and ensuring the effectiveness of that training. One official stressed the importance of comprehensive training to effectively implement a policy that minimizes use of force.

*Policies are one thing, training is another. And it's important that your training mirrors your [policy and] that officers understand through that training, what the intent of that policy is. So, we train our officers [that] our policies, specifically state ... that they should look for the ... least ... means necessary to gain compliance. ... the goal of any force interaction is to gain compliance. And we try to do that. And again, it's recorded in our policy that [is] what we require.*

This underscores the need for comprehensive training to attenuate any difficulties in putting policy in action. One official explained that training “needs to be introduced and implemented week one, in addition to any sort of firearms live fire training.” Departments required use of force be reviewed at least annually. An official explained, “There’s never enough use of force training … minimally, we should have training annually.” Another official also discussed the need for training:

*I think it’s a good idea to at least have that annual training if for no other reason than a refresher [to] review the policy. Make sure they understand the underlying [case] law and standards that they can use with use of force because the vast majority of [officers], fortunately, do not encounter use of force situations on a regular basis.*

Overall, the value of training was reiterated through the interviews, though a few respondents noted the limitations that restrict the possibility for trainings. One official explained, “the more training you have the better, [but] a lot of it comes down to feasibility, with time management taking officers off the street.”

Officials also emphasized that training needed to be ongoing, including regular formal training and personal incident reviews. One official explained that “throughout the year … we give firearms
instruction, and we give scenario-based training.” Other respondents were particularly emphatic about the importance of this ongoing training.

*Once a candidate completes field training, one might think that responsibilities lessen. Not true here. Every officer, with no exceptions for tenure or rank, MUST complete our regular training segments for the rest of their career. ... That’s not annual training. That is MONTHLY training.*

In addition to these regular exercises, police officials stressed that the learning and reflection process was continuous. One official was particularly explicit:

*It needs to be a continuous part of our conversation. ... There should be some sort of review after an action. That’s our policy here. It’s going to be reviewed by the supervisor. And then training is going to be provided near instantaneously if there’s something that could have improved. ... You should always be learning and growing and getting feedback.*

This was reiterated by another interviewee, who explained, “when we have incidents [involving use of force] most of the officers and the supervisors like to do a debrief and think about what can we do better for next time – how [we can] handle the situation a little bit better, so no one gets hurt in the future.” Thus, training was emphasized as a necessary component of effectively implementing a use of force policy.

**Process to Investigate Use of Force**

A second key component for the effective implementation of use of force policy that police officials discussed was a thorough investigation process. Though there was variance in the particular processes employed by different departments, a comprehensive accounting and systematic review of incidents was described by the different respondents. This typically involved interviewing officers, victims, and witnesses, as well as the person(s) to whom force was applied. Information from interviews was sent up the chain of command for further review and comment and possibly referred to Internal Affairs if needed.
Agencies also mandated the analysis of body-worn camera footage after use of force incidents. Police officials specifically emphasized the value of body camera footage to evaluate incidents.

One official said:

*Body cameras are a tremendous tool [for] transparency. ... It also gives me the ability to go back and audit and see what the interactions are with the public. ... To be able to see what exactly you’re doing, we may discover that tactically you’re doing horrible things, we discover great things that you’re doing.*

In several responses, officials also explained how comprehensive review processes can identify issues of concern and ensure effective, targeted officer training.

*We just implemented [the] accountability standards compliance unit. This is basically developed because of the need to dig deeper ... to come up [with] suggestions for officers ... to discuss the problems and tactics properly. ... We also have an early intervention program [for officers who have] so many complaints ... for a certain amount of time.*

### Policy Compliance

Finally, police officials discussed the importance of ensuring appropriate discipline to maintain effective standards and create a culture of compliance within the organization. One official clearly linked discipline with agency culture around use of force: “We have to police ourselves. ... We have to make sure that when those violations of policy occur that we address those immediately. [Seeing] the discipline … sets an example.” Another official echoed the value of standard setting:

*As an agency you kind of establish a culture, and we know what we expect from officers, we put in our training. We make sure policy training is consistent and ... we review all our use of force reports and kind of go through and create that culture and that standard that you want for all your officers and your agency.*

### 4.4 Circumstances that Influence Use of Force
A fourth theme that we explored in our analysis of the data was the circumstances that influence use of force. In addition to information regarding three types of force (those causing death, those causing serious bodily injury, and non-injurious firearm discharges), the FBI Use-of-Force database provides information on attributes encompassed within a use-of-force incident. These attributes include: (1) whether officers knew that a suspect was impaired; (2) the seriousness of the suspected offense; (3) whether weapons are involved; (4) how the officer assessed the suspect’s threat level; (5) whether the suspect resisted arrest; (6) the officer’s experience on the job; (7) the reason for initial contact; (8) whether neighborhood and place matter with respect to the incident location; and (9) race as it relates to the officer and the suspect. To provide context to understanding these factors, we asked police leaders about their views on the impacts of these different factors.

**Known Suspect Impairment**

Officers may be concerned when suspects appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or if the suspect seems to suffer from other types of impairment. Such concern can stem from the presumption that rational decision-making skills and behavior are lacking when someone is impaired. Accordingly, the chances of use of force may increase in order to control a situation when a person appears to be acting irrationally. The law enforcement personnel interviewed for this report generally agreed that known or presumed impairment of the suspect does influence whether force will be used. According to one official:

*Suspect impairment plays a huge role in whether or not an officer is going to get to the threshold of applying force. Obviously anytime that somebody's normal faculties are impaired, their decision-making is also impaired. But I also think too that's where you see a lot of experienced veteran officers tend to have much more success in those situations, than younger officers who haven't experienced impaired people on a regular basis.*
The latter part of the above excerpt relates to a recommendation from another official – that officers should receive specific training with respect to recognition of impairment, and the necessary actions thereafter, considering current drug epidemics:

Exhibiting symptoms of impairment [is] absolutely something that should be considered [in] the totality of the circumstances, with respect to evaluating the situation, the force level [or] resistance level being displayed by the subject ... Particularly in our county, we do have a high substance abuse and overdose level, unfortunately. And so that is something that our [officers] are very familiar with ... And I think it’s something that’s definitely an important consideration to incorporate into policy and to train law enforcement on to be able to recognize those signs.

One official explained that there may be increased danger to officers when impairment is at issue, and they also addressed how the law enforcement response in such situations may be viewed as excessive in some instances:

If someone is impaired, you will see more officers than you typically do. And it’s not to intimidate, but it’s just to control that situation. And that’s the goal of any interaction is to make sure that we are in control of that situation, for the safety of the officers and for the individual that we’re dealing with. So, if it’s certain drugs, we know that there’s superhuman strength that can be involved. There’s certainly the decreased ability for them to feel pain and to react to that. And so, the more officers we have there, the better we are able to handle those situations. ... We, like many agencies, have gotten some undue criticism for the fact that we surround the car with our cars ... that is strictly a safety precaution that we do ... And that’s how our officers are trained to proceed.

It is important to note, however, that the “superhuman strength” concept has been criticized in scholarly research as it is recognized as a trope related to race and drug use (Hart, 2020). Therefore, using this concept may unduly influence the decision to use force in that type of police-citizen interaction (Branch & Branch-Ellis, 2020; Crenshaw et al., 2015). For example, officers involved in the excessive force used against Rodney King and George Floyd recounted conceptions of the victims’ unusual/superhuman strength ( Kushnick, 1999; Marcus, 2022; Spiegel, 1991).
Nonetheless, other officials referred to this concept as well when discussing whether impairment influences the use of force:

*It has some impact. Again, it’s the suspect’s actions, not necessarily that they’re impaired. [But] obviously it’s more of a concern if the impairment is very agitated if you’re talking like the PCP or the molly type drug where somebody is truly erratic, where they’ve got that superhuman strength, I mean obviously all that would play a role.*

**Seriousness of Suspected Offense**

In responding to a crime incident, police officers may be concerned that violence will be used by a suspect based on the seriousness of the offense that has been reported or observed. Law enforcement personnel interviewed for this report explain that assessing the level of harm during an incident they respond to does influence use of force decisions, as the factors that increase the likelihood of harm (e.g., report that suspect is armed) increases the likelihood that an officer may use force). Accordingly, the more serious the crime at issue, the more intrusive the level of force may be. One official stated:

*This is a very important consideration for law enforcement to take into account when evaluating the situation. ... A very severe offense that poses a great risk of harm to the public or to the [officer] is obviously going to be weighed more heavily in that situation versus a minor incident. Obviously, there’s still a law enforcement response necessary, but the level of force must be adjusted accordingly to prevent any type of further harm to the subject to the [officer] and to the public at large.*

Another official discussed how deciding the appropriate level of force to prepare for, in order to “match” the level of suspected harm, may be harder for less experienced officers:

*That’s one of the key factors in *Graham v. Connor* when evaluating excessive force, it depends on what type of crime is being committed. And I think officers tend to struggle between drawing the line between [applying] force on somebody who is on a low level misdemeanor versus somebody who’s wanted for a bank robbery or something like that. But being a young officer [who’s less] experienced to evaluate those situations in a split second [can] be a bit difficult.*
Importantly, interviewees explained that the preparation for force, based on the serious of the suspected offense, does not necessarily mean that a high level of force will be deployed:

*We’re going to look at somebody who is suspected of homicide a lot different than somebody who has a misdemeanor. … Somebody who’s committed homicide [has] already shown that they have the potential to be extremely violent. [But] it’s not carte blanche to say this person did X, Y, and Z and we’re [going to] match for such force. I’ve seen a person on a call where we were set up on a house where we had a new homicide suspect, that person was taken into custody without really any use of force, except for the deployment of some chemical munitions.*

**Weapon Involvement**

It is expected that known weapon involvement will make officers concerned for their safety and the safety of others near the incident location. Suspects may threaten to use or display weapons, so a key aspect of understanding use-of-force decisions is related to suspects’ weapon possession. With respect to weapon involvement, interviewees discussed how this situational factor impacts the type of law enforcement response, and they also explain the importance of having this issue included in their official policies:

*Weapons certainly change the dynamics. … We are paid to make sure that the citizens are safe, that officers are safe, and a suspect is safe. And so that’s why you will typically see multiple [handguns] and a couple of tasers. So, you have your lethal cover and … the hope is that we get compliance. And we can separate the suspect from the weapon, willingly, and then proceed from there. But there’s certainly a different level of response from officers when they know a weapon’s involved.*

Another official stated the following:

*Weapons are] absolutely a consideration if I know that I’m responding somewhere where someone has a firearm. And that’s something you have to be on the lookout for, you have to be prepared for. That heightens the concern [about] resistance. ... [Somebody] reaching down and starting to pull an object out of their waistband [I] don’t have time to wait to see what he’s pulling out of his waistband. I know, based on the facts and circumstances of that call, that this individual is supposed to be armed.*
While weapon involvement can and should influence officers’ decisions to use force, it is important for officers to properly assess whether deadly weapons are actually present during the encounters. Mistakenly identifying suspects as having weapons is dangerous and can lead to the use of unnecessarily high levels of force. For instance, police in Sacramento, California, fatally shot 22-year-old Stephon Clark in 2018 in the backyard of his grandmother’s home while he was holding a cell phone that officers thought was a gun (Luery, 2018). Police in Spotsylvania, Virginia, shot 32-year-old Isiah Brown eight times in 2021 near his home while he was holding a cordless phone that an officer thought was a firearm (Jouvenal, 2021). Police in Chicago, Illinois, shot a 13-year-old boy in May 2022 at a gas station while he was holding a cell phone that officers thought was a gun (Parra & Molina, 2022). Police in Columbus, Ohio, fatally shot 20-year-old Donovan Lewis in August 2022 in his home while he was holding a vape pen that an officer thought was a firearm (Da Silva, 2022). Furthermore, research has shown that the display, threat to use, and actual use of weapons by suspects is relatively rare. In a study by Garner and Maxwell (2002) that examined over 7,500 arrests by eight U.S. police agencies (including St. Petersburg, Florida), suspects displayed, threatened to use, or used weapons in only 1.9% of cases. Accordingly, use-of-force training should include lessons on the accurate identification of weapon involvement in order to prevent such unreasonable, and potentially deadly, use-of-force incidents.

Assessed Suspect Threat to Officer

Police must evaluate the threat level posed by a suspect when arriving at the scene of a crime event. Such an assessment is necessary not only to protect potential victims and bystanders, but also to avoid serious injury to themselves. Accordingly, the chances of use of force may increase in order to control a situation when a person appears to be threatening to the officer’s safety. The officials
agreed that the level at which they evaluate possible harm to themselves does influence whether force will be used, but stressed the importance of officers’ experience with respect to accurate assessments in terms of aspects such as correctly reading body language. For example, one official explained that:

These situations are all completely fluid. [And it] depends on the comfort level and the experience level of the officer. If that officer [is] proficient in [defensive] techniques, then they’re probably not going to be opposed to just going hands on with this person. ... A lot of it depends on the proficiency of the officer. ... No two calls are the same, no two responses to those calls are the same.

It is important to note that although law enforcement encounters rapidly change and often necessitate quick thinking, police officers should be trained to “continuously assess the effectiveness, proportionality, and necessity of their actions, including their tactical positioning, in order to decrease the likelihood of force being needed for self-protection” (New Jersey Attorney General, 2020).

**Whether Suspect Resisted Arrest**

Upon identification of a suspect and resulting orders from police related to an impending arrest, it is possible that the individual will attempt to resist the arrest. A person may resist arrest because they believe that an arrest is unlawful or due to cognitive impairment (Hemmens & Levin, 2000; Hine et al., 2021; Whichard & Felson, 2016). However, the reasons for resistance do not negate the officer’s decision to execute a seizure in the interest of crime investigation or public safety. The officials explained that resistance, especially that which is active (i.e., attempts to avoid physical control such as flailing, tensing arms to avoid handcuffing, or pulling away) or aggressive (i.e., attempts to commit a physical attack) may pose a safety threat to the officer that should be
neutralized. Again, proper assessment of the situation is emphasized. For instance, one official explained that:

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\text{[There must be a clear]} \ \text{understanding of the levels of resistance. ... somebody who's verbally resisting arrest versus somebody who was actively combative, and attempting to harm a deputy, are two very different situations. So, I think it's important to take into consideration whether a suspect is resisting arrest, but also the type of resisting that they're exhibiting in terms of what goes into an officer's totality of the circumstances, evaluation, and what level, if any, of force that's necessary in that particular situation.}
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Interestingly, some officials discussed public perceptions of officers’ responses to resistance. One official stated that:

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\text{We train our officers to truly embrace 21st century policing, to understand that people [want] to have a voice. And so we make sure officers are trained, and we make sure our officers understand that in those types of situations, we need to give people the ability as much as we can to understand what's going on. But the other side of that conversation is at the point where the officers have probable cause, and they are securing that person, whether it's for arrest, or just for the investigation, or just for their safety, that is not the time to debate that, and certainly not the time to resist that. So, the community has to understand that at that point, your responsibility is compliance. And that has not been part of the narrative, and it truly needs to be part of the narrative.}
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While suspect resistance does influence officer behavior, especially with respect to use of force, researchers have recommended more intensive police training that can better prepare officers for identifying specific situations in which the suspect might resist and teach the best practices for de-escalating such situations, as “successfully deescalated situations that prevent suspects from trying to resist arrest may also prevent injuries to officers, suspects, and even bystanders” (Hine et al., 2021, p. 137).

Officer’s Experience/Years on Duty
In almost all of the discussions of the circumstances that contribute to the use of force, police officials mentioned how officer experience in their careers often lead to better outcomes. The Officials’ personal, “on-the-ground” knowledge is supported by empirical research as well. Multiple studies indicate that officers’ years on duty are associated with years on the force, as younger and/or less experienced officers are more likely to use force (Brandl & Stroshine, 2012; Brandl et al., 2001; McElvain & Kposowa, 2004; Paoline & Terrill, 2007) and that “the ability to react and assess situations calmly, with a greater sense of control, and less negatively may be related to the production of accurate, effective, and efficient behaviors that mark expert policing” (Ta et al., 2021, p. 520). For instance, one official explained that:

*I think people who have been on the force longer are going to have more life and professional experience that goes into evaluating these factors. But I also think that somebody who’s been on the force a shorter amount of time, should still have that training foundation in terms of going through the factors that they need to weigh in any particular situation where force may be used.*

One official also discussed that the correlation between use of force decisions and officers’ experience may be a function of different duties and assignments as one moves up the department’s ladder:

*Experience provides tools that you wouldn’t have … when the only tool you feel like you have is a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail. … The other issue is, traditionally, [for more senior] officers, the chances of maybe engaging in the use of force are next to none because [they’re] not in an environment where use of force would be necessary. So, I think if you were to do research, then you would find that certainly senior officers don’t get involved in use of force often. But a lot of that is likely due to position and experience.*

Considering the importance of officer experience and decisions on use of force, one recommendation is to have greater rotation in face-to-face police-citizen interactions for more and less experienced officers. Brandl and Stroshine (2012) suggest that since less desirable shifts (late night/early morning) that are more likely to be assigned to younger officers are associated with
higher use of force incidents. Specifically with respect to the implications of the relationship between age and use of force, many high-profile deadly police shootings have involved young(er) officers (O’Flaherty & Sethi, 2019). In Ferguson, Missouri, Darren Wilson was 28 when he fatally shot Michael Brown; In New York, Daniel Pantaleo was 29 when he put Eric Garner in a fatal chokehold; in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Blake Salamoni was 28 when he fatally shot Alton Sterling; and in Cleveland, Ohio, Timothy Loehmann was 26 when he fatally shot Tamir Rice (Georgantopoulos, 2015). Therefore, a key recommendation based on the responses from our interviewees is to have more extensive training for new officers before they are assigned to shifts with direct police-citizen contact, as the high-stress nature of the job requires sharpened skills to continuously meet goals and perform the duties safely.

**Reason for Initial Contact**

Police encounters with citizens have a number of origins. These could include routine patrols, requests for medical/welfare assistance, requests for service (i.e., reporting of suspicious activity), Terry or Whren stops, or execution of warrants (Banks et al., 2019). Depending on the reason for the initial contact, officers must prepare for the possible outcomes of these encounters to ensure the safety of everyone involved and at the scene. Some of the police officials discussed how the type of contact can influence their mindset on what to expect when approaching a scene or suspect. For instance, since domestic violence incidents are particularly dangerous, there may be a higher likelihood of force being displayed or used.
Some officials described being on “high alert” during almost all contacts, and that the way a contact situation evolves, as well as the individuals’ reaction to police presence, ultimately determine whether force is used. One official stated:

*We try to instill and ingrain in our officers that every encounter can turn dangerous at any moment, so ... in part, that they have to be cognizant of everything around them. No matter the situation – if it’s a routine color code response to high risk situation – should always have your wits about you and always be prepared for anything to happen.*

It cannot be understated that being prepared for and aware of the dynamic nature of a police-citizen contact is needed and should be trained. Nevertheless, it is notable that some police veterans and policing scholars have discussed that operating with a constant state of fearfulness and heightened expectations of danger can have a negative impact on how the general public and their specific community thinks about and reacts to police (O’Flaugherty & Sethi, 2019; Smith, 2018).

**Neighborhood/Place Effects: Type of Location and Incident Location**

Following the decision to initiate contact with citizens (e.g., intervening during the presence of suspicious behavior), police officers must assess the environment in order to address the situation as effectively and safely as possible. Crawford and Burns (2008) note that upon responding to a location, “there is a territorial awareness and perception held by police officers that carries a normative standard for the appropriate behavior and activities for a given place” (p. 323). An officer may make, or be prepared to make, different use of force decisions in areas with higher crime rates versus areas with lower crime rates. For example, a call for service from a nightclub with an extensive record of assault reports could create preconceptions about what, if any, threats may be at the scene.
Garner and colleagues (2002) found that responses at a location known for criminal activity was associated with increased prevalence of force by officers. Police may also make, or be prepared to make, different use of force decisions in public versus private areas. Reiss (1972) and Schuck (2004) indicated that officers tend to use more force in private settings as opposed to public settings, as exposure is relatively low, and the incident is likely to involve domestic dispute. Some of the police officials explained that the type/location of police-citizen interactions may indeed influence use of force decisions:

*If you have somebody who’s resisting in front of a large crowd, the crowd can play a huge role in it from a safety standpoint versus you one-on-one in a domestic situation. ... So locations can be a big factor on the importance of making sure that use of force is correct and taking care of the situation quickly.*

Other officials believed that the place/location itself should not always influence, or predetermine, use of force:

*I think some environmental factors play more of a role than where the crime is committed. You absolutely have to consider your surroundings and the potential for other people to become involved or be injured by our response or by the subject. ... But I don’t know that I care that it’s a business or it’s a house or it’s the street. ... [It’s about whether] somebody else can get hurt because of where this is happening.*

Accordingly, based on officials’ responses, decisions about use of force are (and should be) most influenced in real-time where the situation and location can be evaluated with the most information, rather than static notions about particular tactics and approaches.

**Race of Suspect and Race of Officer/Shared Backgrounds**

One of the most prominent aspects in the national use of force discussion is the influence of race. The attention to race is a reflection of what appear to be disparities in fatal police-citizen interactions as well as an acknowledgment of the role that implicit and explicit biases may have
played in high-profile shootings of racial minorities. Potential bias has been debated with reference to firearms training with news reports of police departments using images of Black individuals as targets in firearms training (Bozarjian, 2022; Winter, 2015). This discussion is also informed by several national databases on fatal police events (e.g., The Counted; Fatal Force; Fatal Encounters; Mapping Police Violence) as well as empirical studies (e.g., Sharara & Wool, 2021; Streeter, 2019) that indicate that Black Americans are approximately more likely to be killed by police as compared to White Americans. The interview responses from police officials, however, stated that suspect race should not be a factor in use of force decisions:

[Officers] are trained and should be trained to evaluate a situation based on a person’s actions, not based on what they look like in any respect ... it should play no role in an officer’s response to a particular subject in any way, shape, or form in evaluating whether use of force is appropriate in the situation. It should be based strictly on the background information that may be known to law enforcement about that particular subject with respect to prior violent criminal history or violence towards law enforcement, and then how that particular subject is acting.

Furthermore, there is scholarly attention to, and recent agency policies about, increasing diversity in law enforcement agencies. The argument for this is based on improving police-citizen relations, as it is believed that officers will be more likely to have positive interactions with residents with whom they share a sociocultural background (Hur, 2012; Meuris, 2022; Smith, 2003; Spell et al., 2021). Generally, the police officials did not necessarily see the race of the officer as relevant in the use of force. However, they did point out that all officers should be aware of the history of strained relationships with minority communities or be trained in cultural competence, and use that to inform their decisions on how to interact. Two examples of this discussion are below:

I do also understand that race may play a role in how a subject may perceive law enforcement. And so therefore, I think law enforcement should have an understanding that a person may be interacting with them as a law enforcement officer based on notions [or]
beliefs that they may hold about law enforcement. [Officers should be] sensitive to that as a consideration when they’re interacting with someone.

Understanding culture is much more important than who I sent ... Whether I send a white officer, African American officer, male officer, female officer, that’s much less important than whether or not that officer is culturally sensitive [and] understands how certain cultures respond to certain situations. And so, the mistrust among some of our minority communities is absolutely real, and based on years and years of bad experiences [with] law enforcement. And unfortunately, in many situations, officers may not have responded as appropriately as we would have liked them to. [Being] able to understand why that person may be reacting the way they are, is critically important to how we handle that situation.

It should be noted, however, that the burden of improving police-community relations should not be borne primarily by residents. Due to the aforementioned police-related harms that have been experienced by these communities over decades, redress must begin with changes in police policy as well as the implementation of engagement practices.

4.5 General Policy Environment for Police Agencies

To understand the general policy environment within law enforcement agencies in Florida, we asked a series of questions about the methods used by police agencies to improve their use of force policies and recommendations for improvements. We primarily heard from officials that there were three ways that agencies remained current and at the forefront of policy development. Agencies often looked to their peers in nearby geographic proximity to make sure their policies were closely aligned and also drew from external sources such as organizations, universities, and the private sector for best practices. Also, officials expressed that leadership played an important role in guiding policy development and policy reform. Another aspect to policy reform that officials mentioned was that when mistakes occurred, this oftentimes triggered changes in use of force policies.
Finally, we conclude by sharing recommendations from law enforcement personnel in regards to particular policies they would like to see included or new policies that should be considered more generally in the discussion about police reform.

Sources for Integrating Best Practices in Police Use of Force

Several police officials noted that part of their practices include learning from other agencies in terms of best practices and adopting new policies or improving existing policies. For instance, a law enforcement official explained that their agency frequently reviews and assesses other agencies and best practices to improve current policy language. Agencies also turn to a range of “external public, private and academic experts that work with senior and non-senior officers around use of force training, adopting innovative teaching styles and philosophies and decision-making principles from the U.S. military and private businesses on leadership.” These tools along with reading lists and workshops offered by nearby universities are also utilized to expand officer training and knowledge around use of force best practices.

While officials frequently noted looking to other agencies as references for use of force, one official shared that hearing the perspectives of residents are also helpful in making adjustment to policies:

So the advice that I give to organizations is, to the best of your ability, find people that are in the community that you can communicate with, they can give you things whether formally or informally, an accurate assessment of what they need, or what they believe they need from you.
In addition to needing community perspectives to understand what residents’ needs are and building stronger relationships between police and the community, officials also draw from organizations such as the National Institute of Corrections, FBI, Florida Sheriffs Association, the National Sheriffs Association, American Jail Association, and accrediting bodies. These organizations set standards for the state of Florida and support ways to improve police performance. Accreditation boards are especially useful as agencies will keep track of both local and national models at agencies that are in the same geographic region. Looking towards nearby agencies was also noted as a useful tool when considering tweaking policy language or making minor changes to police use of force policies. Law enforcement personnel shared in interviews the importance of being on the same page with surrounding agencies and “making sure policies are aligned” so there is a clear and holistic picture of areas of improvement and implementation.

Leadership Defines Police Culture and Policy Changes

When asked about the role of leadership in changing departmental policy and culture around use of force, police officials frequently discussed the importance of good leadership in not only policy development, but also in building an inclusive culture, and setting the tone for good policing and accountability systems. One official explained how leadership defines the culture of police agencies:

*Leadership plays a huge role, because ultimately not only do they have to really communicate and provide scenario-based training on the use of force - the burden of responsibility kind of falls on the leadership even though the policies are enacted by officers and staff.*

This perspective of leadership playing an instrumental role in the climate and culture dictating appropriate behavior and actions with police use of force were common themes we heard throughout our interviews. Officials shared consistent perspectives that leadership must be held to
the highest standard and show “regular patrol officers the right way to do things,” as police officers are called “to serve the public.” Officials further highlighted that senior officers must set the tone from the top and, if that is not done, then junior officers will get the impression that they can “do whatever they want and they don't have to carry themselves in a certain way and that's just not acceptable.”

Officials explained that leading from the front is imperative, and that first line supervisors and sergeants can be the most influential people in any police department, and they can “change culture” by following policies and procedures and providing the rationale behind policies and holding officers to account. This accountability was noted by one official who said, “that accountability starts with our first line supervisors, but it’s got to go up and down the chain and has got to permeate throughout the organization.” This can happen both informally and formally depending on the level of the policy, and whether it’s a bureau directive or a formal policy change. Inherently, departmental culture drives whether policy changes are made and their effectiveness. Officials described that when there is a gap in policy, more formal processes are used to make recommendations to shore up any gaps that exist and changes can be made immediately to ensure agencies are following best practices in use of force.

Mistakes Trigger Policy Changes

In addition to the role of leadership in influencing departmental culture and policy changes in use of force, police officials also noted that policy changes are also spurred by mistakes made by law enforcement. Officials discussed disciplining officers when specific use of force policies were ignored. In these instances, agencies might hold a roundtable that will help with discipline
decisions for a particular officer. In addition to discipline, use of force policies will be reviewed because of the incident and the gaps will be addressed. For instance, one official noted their Firearms Policy is reviewed annually and, if incidents arise that are outside the purview of that policy, a correction or modification will be made based on the incident. Changes such as these can be triggered by a specific incident. For instance, Kentucky passed a bill that limits the use of no-knock warrants approximately one year after the police killing of Breonna Taylor in 2020, which garnered calls for change in Louisville and other American cities. Also, in 2022, the Chicago Police Department revised policy to prevent officers from chasing people on foot simply because they run away or have committed minor offenses, a change that came after a foot pursuit ended with officers fatally shooting 13-year-old Adam Toledo.

**General Policy Recommendations**

When we asked police officials about what particular use of force policies or reforms they would recommend being added or considered, we found four key themes. Officials suggested that: (1) agencies implement 8Can’tWait policies; (2) police should be included in the conversations about policy changes; (3) agencies should respond more effectively to current data and conditions on the ground; and (4) police and residents should be included in the larger conversations about use of force.

**Incorporate 8can’twait into police use of force policies**

First, police officials often used 8can’twait policies as best practices that all agencies should integrate into their police use of force policies. While some officials suggested caveats or criticized absolutes, the majority supported the eight policies, with several officials being on the forefront of guiding other agencies on use of force / response to resistance reforms. Several officials recommend not only incorporating 8can’twait policies, but also making sure that departments’ code
of ethics are also aligned. Furthering the recognition of 8can’twait policies, officials also recommend adhering to model policies set by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Doing so is especially important to having national best practices and making sure that agency standards match current local agency training policies. According to officials, this indicates a commitment to changing policies when needed, not only for accreditation purposes but also for making progress toward improving use of force decision making.

Respond to data and conditions on the ground

Another aspect that police officials noted is that agencies also have to respond to the data and conditions on the ground, and when there is a misalignment, then make the necessary adjustments to protect officers and the public. One official explained what is needed to make such adjustments:

*Being more transparent with your community and being an active participant in your community, and I think all of our general orders really speak to that. The way that we do business is pretty much ingrained in the documents that we abide by. Data transparency comes down to understanding that it is a two-way street requiring communication. And just because this is the way we’re doing business currently doesn’t mean that tomorrow we can’t adapt and change [the] way the community desires. ”*

Being transparent was also mentioned by several other officials because it is a starting point of recognizing when “policies are deficient and when there is a need to tweak policies to align with best practices and see if the data is telling you something to change.” Transparency is essential to making any future policy decisions and, without it, systems will continue to have challenges.

Include police in the conversation

While police agencies are at the center of debates on reform proposals (e.g., reallocation of funds), several officials expressed that they felt police were omitted from the conversation about use of
force. According to them, public discourse, rather than practitioners’ experience, was pushing the narrative on reform. One official stated:

*I think my concern is when people talk about police reform oftentimes the police are left out. And if I’m trying to reform the medical profession, and I am not a doctor, I don’t have the expertise of a doctor, I would not reform medical practices, without more specific knowledge from people that know that field.*

This perspective was further discussed by another official who noted that changing legal standards could be problematic. They used a hypothetical example to make their point:

*I can be getting out of my car in a parking lot, some individual starts running towards me screaming, “I hate the police, I’m going to kill you” and they point a gun at me. ... I end up having to shoot that person. Well, subsequently, we find out that the gun was unloaded, that it was an individual with mental issues who was attempting to commit suicide by police.*

This official highlighted such an example because questions will certainly arise following public knowledge of the incident, such as “Was it necessary for me to shoot a suicidal person who had no intention of shooting me and had an unloaded gun?” This example also indicates how it may, at times, be unrealistic or unreasonable for an officer to know that an individual was unarmed and that deadly force was not needed. While shooting in this type of situation would be unnecessary, it could be seen as reasonable based on the initial and rapid assessment by the officer. Police officials who held this perspective did not support proposals to use the minimal amount of force necessary and felt in these instances, policies were being proposed and supported without perspectives of officers who have to quickly make life or death decisions.

There was also a general notion by officials that although there are some “bad actors” within police agencies, these are not “necessarily systemic deficiencies – only individual deficiencies.” We consistently heard this perspective from officials despite the disparate impacts on Black and Brown
people when it relates to deaths caused by police use of force. Furthermore, officials suggested that this gap can be closed by including police officers in the conversation because, “unless you know why and how the job is being done, it’s very difficult to hold somebody to a standard when you don’t know really what type of standards you’re holding them to.”

**Incorporate community review boards**

Lastly, several police officials recommended integrating some form of community advisory committees to review use of force incidents. This could be either informal or formal community review boards where residents have a platform to share their perspectives on a regular basis. Officials discussed the importance of this type of oversight in building stronger relationships between law enforcement agencies and communities. These review boards would serve as an open line of communication between law enforcement agencies and residents where, “the community can give meaningful input and bring that to the law enforcement agency and have them [really] look at it in terms of whether that may be something that can be incorporated.” Furthermore, community review boards can serve an important role by providing an external assessment since internal self-reviews of use of force incidents could be contradictory. However, some officials had concerns about community review boards because “residents would need to be a lot more educated” for their views to be accurate. Though such boards are considered progressive way to implement much-needed police reform, officials noted substantial challenges in giving residents a governing position without them having practical experience.

### 4.6 Police Agencies Relationship with the Public
Law enforcement agencies’ relationship with the public is central to fostering trust with communities and building strong long-term partnerships. We asked questions about the historical relationship between police and communities, as well as the factors that play into the police-community relations. There were a range of responses depending on how police officials defined what good or poor community relationships are. One aspect that stood out in the responses was the role of George Floyd’s murder in 2020 and the subsequent tensions that arose between communities and law enforcement agencies. This had a direct influence on policy reform efforts. Another factor discussed was that police agencies’ ability to be transparent and communicate with the public played a significant role in the type of relationship that was established. Lastly, officials stated that it is also important for agencies to implement community policing efforts to change the dynamic between law enforcement and historically marginalized communities.

Influence of George Floyd

When we asked police officials about historical relationships between their agency and the communities being served, many noted the paradigm shift in 2020 as being significant in heightening tensions between law enforcement and communities of color. While some agencies noted that there were good historical relationships between law enforcement and communities of color, most did acknowledge a change since Floyd’s murder. Officials also acknowledged that prior experiences with police play a major role in perceptions of the police. One official discussed this dynamic:

_How they interact with people is going to have lasting effects ... Right after an incident like that [George Floyd], those people who, maybe have it after law enforcement, they’re going to be more vocal about it._

Another official compared current tensions to interactions several decades ago, and expressed that the relationship between police and communities of color are actually better:
Maybe I’m seeing it through rose-colored glasses, I see that it's better. It’s better than it was 30 years ago, and policy changes have a lot to do with that. [There was] a shooting a police shooting here 35, 40 years ago. ... The [officer] chases the guy at the foot of the courthouse steps and the guy tries to get in the courthouse, and he shoots and kills the African American guy ... that was legal. Now, there were protests, there was a grand jury impaneled and the [officer] was exonerated and eventually ran for [leadership and won].

The official shared this story to illustrate that while high-profile police killings of people of color, like George Floyd, rightfully sparks protest and demands for change, if someone takes a longer view or “30,000 foot view,” they can see that things have improved. For instance, in recent years, officers have been prosecuted for what previously would have been excused. While there is not complete trust of law enforcement by communities of color, residents do express that they want a police presence, but they expect it to be fair and honest (Saad, 2020).

**Law enforcement transparency and communication**

As noted earlier, being transparent with the public was another factor that plays into the role law enforcement have with the public. Police officials consistently shared that engaging with the public around incidents involving police use of force, and resolving any tensions, is crucial to gaining trust and having a positive relationship with the community being served. One official said:

*Transparency is a big thing with us [and] talking about policies and the way we do business is important. We have officers go out there and they’ll just talk, get that face-to-face interaction and that seems to be really good for everybody involved.*

Officer transparency helps to support the agency’s ability to communicate with the public as well. While some officials felt that their agencies had positive relationships with communities served, others acknowledged that there might be small groups of individuals who believe law enforcement is not treating them fairly, and some officers also feel that they are being treated unfairly. Fruitful discussions and transparency can bridge this gap and improve relationships so that when negative
incidents do happen, agencies can get out in front of it and have conversations with residents who are confident in an open line of communication. In addition to good communication, officials explained that substantively engaging with the communities they serve is also instrumental to building relationships with residents.

**Working on the ground in the community**

Several of the police officials spoke about implementing community policing and having an active, positive presence. This includes participating in food drives, working with local businesses, mentoring youth at Boys and Girls clubs, and attending community events. Officers have to “walk the walk” in terms of doing community service and meet community needs. A few agencies discussed their emphasis on having specific community liaison officers that offer assistance to those experiencing homelessness, act as resource officers at the schools, or work in apartment complexes to meet with people to discuss ongoing issues. These more community-based policing efforts discussed by officials were described as necessary practices to build strong relationships between law enforcement and the public.

**The Public’s Role in Policy Reform Process**

When asked about the public’s role in shaping policy reform, officials noted limited options. However, they explained that the limited options, such as community review boards and advocacy by politicians and community leaders, had some minimal impact. Overall, we heard from officials that informal engagement with residents seemed to be easier and more beneficial to supporting policy reform efforts.
Few agencies had community review boards; however, those that did discussed their usefulness in reviewing use of force applications. Where community review boards exist, members are able to see incident videos and make recommendations regarding whether the use of force was justified. Officials shared that this level of external governance was much needed, but representatives would need to have baseline education to be able to make appropriate recommendations on policy changes. Community review boards in general would need to be consistently utilized by agencies to better understand their impacts on any policy reforms. Additionally, officials said that they valued community input, and spoke of ways to integrate residents’ feedback might also include periodic surveys or working with officers and elected officials to analyze their use of force policies.

Furthermore, officials discussed that local politicians and reform advocates play a minor role in affecting change as well. This is accomplished through peaceful protests that bring issues of injustice to the forefront of discussions, especially with respect to the disproportionate impact of police use of force on communities of color. These efforts were especially acute post-George Floyd and have continued to some degree.

While formal processes can move the needle, officials discussed how informal engagement with the public seemed to be more effective in generating conversations that facilitate information sharing. They also believed that interactions that are not rigid build better working relationships between law enforcement, businesses, and residents. Community leaders can oftentimes play a pivotal role in communicating with law enforcement personnel and providing feedback about the areas in which police can improve. Although residents may not be formally involved with policy reform, they can share opinions on certain policies that could result in changes. This process of sharing information and ideas can also foster trust in this partnership and transparency with the
community. Overall, these more informal processes put responsibility on residents to hold law enforcement agencies accountable. However, this also raises questions about power differentials and law enforcement personnel’s duty to serve. Community responsibility can only go so far, as police agencies also need to be held accountable through formal processes and not rely on social movements to make needed policy changes.

5.0 Policy Recommendations

In addition to recommendations suggested by police officers we interviewed, we offer more specific recommendations for local-level and state-level agencies. These recommendations are not exhaustive, but represent a more explicit approach to integrating standardized data collection procedures, additional training, inclusive engagement practices, and community-focused policing.

(A) Local-level recommendations for police agencies

A1: Improve communication with communities of color.

While police agencies have been a central target of the Black Lives Matter movement with calls to defund the police, this has been met with great resistance from police officers and leaders. We consistently heard from police leadership that despite the perceived disparate impact on African Americans regarding use of force, race was not and should not be a factor in use of force incidents. However, this disjuncture between the perceptions of the police in communities of color and the perspectives of police leadership highlights the need to address these historically strained
relationships. Many respondents acknowledged the importance of engaging with the public, particularly communities of color that have historically had contentious relationships with law enforcement. Police leadership particularly discussed informal community engagement strategies as successful methods helping to address historically strained relationships. Police leaders acknowledged that efforts to be more transparent should be a central element in improving historically strained relationships with communities of color. Building on our research, we recommend three ways to improve these dynamics:

- **Center and elevate the importance of transparency and communication around the use of force policies employed by agencies.** Transparency and communication were discussed by police leadership as being paramount to advancing the relationship between law enforcement personnel and communities of color. We recommend elevating the importance of transparency in all policies and communications with the public regarding use of force incidents to avoid further eroding the public trust of law enforcement. Use of force policies should be readily and easily accessible to the public.

- **Improve transparency and accountability through increased digital information sharing via social media.** To build public trust, police agencies need to improve information accessibility to the public. Social media can be a useful platform for police agencies to provide data, reports, and hold collective forums that keep the public up-to-date on use of force incidents and policy reform processes. For instance, police can use social media to engage with the community following high-profile events. Recent research found that agencies used Twitter more frequently in the immediate aftermath of George Floyd’s death to share information regarding demonstrations and respond to residents’ concerns, and community members responded positively to such communication, shown
by “favoriting” and retweeting agencies’ posts (Dong & Wu, 2022; see also Thomas et al., 2022).

- **Conduct monthly roundtables with communities, stakeholders, and activists.** Having inclusive conversations about use of force is important, and monthly town halls are one method of including a wide variety of stakeholders in the conversation, including police, external organizations, and residents.

**A2: Build formalized connections between police and communities of color.**

In addition to developing communication channels that improve transparency, it is necessary to formalize community relations to policing, including reviews of police of force incidents and policy reform discussions. Police leadership shared various ways that agencies are actively working on being more engaged through community policing and service efforts to stay in tune with resident needs. Police leadership particularly discussed informal community engagement strategies. While informal community engagement methods are one important strategy for improving relationships with the public, formal community engagement strategies such as review boards are also important. Police leadership suggested that engaging with the public around policy reform needed to be a more inclusive process with both police and residents at the table making decisions collectively. In some cases, police leaders felt that they were left out of the process; in other cases, they agreed that residents are oftentimes left out of any decision-making processes for police policy reform. More formal processes that elevate accountability and transparency may also be helpful in improving strained police relationships with the public, particularly communities of color.
- **Create community review boards that have decision-making authority.** Community review boards were noted by interviewees as the future of community engagement and involvement in police agency governance. While questions still remain about the organizational structure and reach of community review boards, police leaders recommended integrating some form of community advisory committees for police use of force reviews. This could take the form of community review boards where residents have a platform to give input and share their perspectives on a regular basis regarding police use of force policies.

- **Create more formal community policing programs to strengthen law enforcement and community relationships.** As noted by interviewees, law enforcement agencies largely rely upon informal community engagement and policing programs to build relationships between police and residents. However, more formal community policing programs could help officers to build relationships and experience conducting police work in the context of the community. These can include youth programming as well as citizen academies. For example, the Gainesville Police Department has a Citizen’s Police Academy that aims to encourage citizen interaction with police by providing information on how officers exercise their duties (e.g., search and seizure) and how the agency forms partnerships with community groups.

**A3: Improve access to critical trainings on use of force for police officers.**

Police leaders generally agreed with the need to ensure access to training for police officers, as well as the need for more proactive strategies to build stronger relationships with communities being served. They discussed how increased officer experience in the field often leads to better
outcomes. This experiential knowledge is noted in many research studies that suggest officers’ years on duty are associated with years on the force, as younger officers and/or less experienced officers are more likely to use force (Brandl & Stroshine, 2012). Additional training was recognized by police leaders as a key component of effectively implementing a use of force policy. Integrating cultural competency training was also noted by police leaders as an important element of learning and reflection for police officers when engaging with historically marginalized communities. Thus, we have four suggestions regarding how to support officers getting necessary experience and training opportunities.

- **Support and enhance opportunities for officers to interact with community members and develop experience in community policing.** Considering the importance of officer experience and use of force decisions, one recommendation is to have greater rotation in face-to-face police-citizen interactions for more and less experienced officers. This may decrease use of force incidents.

- **Provide more opportunities for comprehensive use of force training for police officers.** The importance of providing training and ensuring the effectiveness of that training was consistently discussed, and police leaders advocated for more training throughout the year on use of force to limit use of force incidents and better prepare officers.

- **Offer cultural competency and implicit bias training by external organizations.** Our interviewees did not necessarily see the officer race as relevant in the use of force. However, they did point out that all officers should be aware of the history of strained relationships with minority communities and possess the cultural competence to negotiate
these relationships. Expanding cultural competence can create a better foundation to inform police officer decision-making in their interactions with a diverse public.

- **Establish Offices of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI).** Following the death of George Floyd, city agencies and private sector organizations have increasingly started or integrated Offices of DEI within their organizations to develop institutional policies and operational practices that are more inclusive. Police agencies may similarly benefit from access to an Office of DEI to support the development of more policies that encourage inclusivity in recruitment and hiring, and in external relationships with the communities being served.

**A4: Develop collaborative research relationships and data transparency.**

Many police leaders acknowledged the importance of public transparency. While community engagement methods are important strategies for improving transparency, it is also important to develop connections to research institutions and make data easily accessible to facilitate critical inquiry into police practice. It is essential for legislators, police administrators, and researchers to establish collaborative engagement networks to facilitate system planning and implementation. For instance, policymakers can discuss the empirical findings of scholarly examinations with scholars from research institutions before and during the drafting of reform-related policies and laws. Also, as with the current project, police administrators can speak with researchers who study police performance and procedures to ensure comprehensive coverage of topics—and administrators can encourage their officers to do the same when appropriate. Ultimately, accomplishing wide-ranging and effective police reform must involve multiple groups that, despite their different skills and expertise (i.e., legislators, police, scholars), are similarly motivated in
implementing changes that work. This will help combat misinformation as well as enable police and legislators to make necessary adjustments in policies to protect officers and the public, as well as ensure public accountability.

- **Collect and share better contextual data to observe more nuanced patterns in use of force.** As noted previously, data is difficult to access and collected unevenly. If data collection is more effective, streamlined and standardized, and more effectively shared, conversations about use of force policies can be informed by the data and conditions on the ground. This is an important way to ensure that policy is informed by research rather than simply existing perceptions. It also provides an important avenue to combat misperceptions about police use of force.

- **Create collaborative engagement networks among law enforcement agencies and research institutions.** Due to the limited data on use of force available to the public, as well as difficulties gaining access to police leadership, it was especially challenging to glean a more comprehensive understanding of the nuances between policies on the books and application by law enforcement on the ground. We recommend police agencies participate in more collaborative networks with researchers to bridge this gap to provide more comprehensive research analysis on use of force in Florida.

**A5: Incorporate best practices in use of force from various sources.**

Incorporating best practices for use of force policies were generally supported by most police leaders interviewed. While some leaders did offer caveats to incorporating the eight policies advocated by Campaign Zero’s 8cantwait campaign, most acknowledged the general effectiveness of such policies in decreasing use of force incidents and their value as a
consideration in policy discussions. Interviewees also recommend adhering to model policies set by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Beyond the minimal requirements for accreditation purposes, it is imperative that police agencies strive to take the steps needed to improve police use of force policies. It is especially important to ensure that police agency standards match national best practices.

- **Implement best practices found to be effective at decreasing use of force incidents.** Officials often considered "can't wait" policies as best practices that all agencies should integrate into their use of force mandates. More research should solidify which policies are effective, and then established them as best practices.

**(B) State-level recommendations for organizations**

**B1: Standardize data collection for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and ensure it is readily available to the public.**

To improve law enforcement agencies’ transparency with the public, additional steps are needed in both data collection and distribution. Currently, it appears that only the data required by the FBI’s Use of Force collection program is (inconsistently) collected by local jurisdictions and maintained by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). This data is not readily available when a member of the public wishes to access it and is difficult to analyze. The extensive effort required to both access the data and process it for analysis impedes the goal of ensuring transparency.

- **Collected data should be standardized.** Each police agency interpreted what was appropriate to share with the FDLE and FBI police use of force database. There was not a standard response to what information should be shared. While police leaders were often
well-versed in internal reporting policies, they were often uncertain about what information they cataloged in the state and federal databases or who was responsible for it. Noting the issues this created and the difficulty comparing across jurisdictions in the federally reported data, one interviewee noted, “there should be a good transparent nationwide standard for how forces reported to ensure that everybody’s doing it the same.”

- **Data should be complete and finalized when reported.** This means there should be an entry (e.g., yes, no) in every field. When data is incomplete (i.e., there is still an active investigation of the incident), updates should be made as soon as possible to ensure that entries are complete. The data currently collected for the Use of Force database is inconsistent. Reliable reporting is essential for effective analysis.

- **Additional information should be reported, including locational data.** In addition to the data that are already reported, there should be expanded information made available. This includes increasing the force categories reported to include all incidents in which a member of the public is injured. More jurisdictional attributes (i.e., division of agency, region of jurisdiction, and shift) should be collected to better evaluate patterns in the use of force. Additionally, the reason that force was used should be more clearly delineated, separating out whether the suspect was fleeing or being aggressive, for example. Beyond including the additional tabular data above, the reports should also include locational data (standardized as either latitude/longitude coordinates or street address) to facilitate spatial analysis within and between jurisdictions.

- **Use of force data should be readily available and accessible to the public.** Currently, Use of Force data is only available through a public records request, and is delivered in PDF files. We suggest that this data be readily available on a distribution web page (similar
to crime rate data on the FDLE website) in analysis-ready formats, for example, .csv, .xlsx, or shapefile.

**B2: Create state- and nationwide programs to incentivize complete data reporting.**

Increased resources are needed to collect and maintain additional, more consistent, and more available data. Dedicated funds should be distributed through state and federal programs to enable agencies to thoroughly collect and report incident data. These funds should also provide for data management and maintenance (i.e., costs associated with the database, personnel, etc.) with additional financial support to make the data publicly available and accessible. Currently, public discussions are often informed by data collected by media organizations and public policing transparency projects. Since such information is not systematically collected from police agencies, there are concerns about accuracy. Comprehensive collection of use of force data can better inform public discussions.

- **Incentivize policy agencies engaging in data collection and maintenance by providing state and federal funding to support this work.** Expanding funds distributed to local jurisdictions will allow for dedicated staff to collect information from incident reports and transmit the collected information to the FDLE databases. To further assist in training and implementation of these data procedures, it is suggested that workshops be funded (i.e., no cost to attend) and held by federal and state law enforcement agencies.

**B3: Implement laws mandating comprehensive data tracking and reporting.**

To improve transparency efforts, and improve public confidence, states should pass legislation that requires law enforcement agencies to implement systems that track and report instances of police misconduct. The ideal tracking and reporting system will be both accurate and accessible, and
provide specific details about internal investigations conducted following allegations of misconduct (e.g., use of excessive force) and the corresponding disciplinary action taken by the agency. To meet these goals, we have two specific recommendations.

- **State legislation should require police agencies to release information on the use of force incidents to the public.** Rather than being reactive to records requests, state legislation can encourage police agencies to be proactive, taking the lead in releasing such information for the public to access. As of now, the creation and maintenance of accountability data have mostly been accomplished by journalists who focus on open access to government data. For example, USA Today had to go through a lengthy public records request process in order to publish its database of disciplinary records of thousands of police officers who were investigated for misconduct (USA Today, 2019). This database includes more than 30,000 officers who were decertified after sustained investigations. Also, journalists from WNYC, New York State’s Public Radio, detailed the difficulty in receiving information about a police officer’s disciplinary history in several states due to legislative acts and agency withholding (WNYC News, 2015). But legislation can improve public data accessibility and accountability. For example, the Philadelphia (Pennsylvania) Police Department publishes datasets that explain its accountability process. These datasets include publicly available: (a) lists of civilian complaints against police; (b) demographic details of the officers involved along with the status of the internal investigation and the findings when the investigation is complete; and (c) demographic details of the individuals who filed the complaints. The datasets are updated monthly and include information about complaints from the previous five years (OpenPhillyData, 2022). While creating and maintaining such a detailed transparency system requires substantial time and resources,
police agencies can enlist the help of motivated organizations as well as researchers and data analysts. The Philadelphia Department’s system was constructed by a GIS software firm, which was partially done pro bono. The system was also supported by applying for and receiving grants. Another example is the transparency effort by the city of San Francisco, California (2022). The city has a Department of Police Accountability that investigates complaints about officers and recommends policy changes. The department publishes reports on police complaints each year, which detail the number, types, and findings of the complaints, and its website includes a dashboard of the complaints that have been received.

- **State legislation should also require state-wide tracking of officers with repeat incidents and allegations of police use of force misconduct.** In addition to openness of use of force incident records, police reform advocates have discussed the importance of tracking systems that identify officers with repeated incidents and misconduct allegations. Empirical research has found that “a small percentage of officers account for a disproportionate amount of citizen complaints” (Terrill & Ingram, 2016, p. 151; see also Harris, 2011; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 1996; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005). Therefore, it is essential to address the proverbial “bad apples” (Sierra & Papachristos, 2021) as well as groups, or “crews,” of officers who coordinate misconduct (Jain et al., 2022). Establishing an integrated tracking system is beneficial for the public as well as law enforcement agencies, as a cross-agency network can help agencies detect problematic officers and avoid re-hiring them after patterns of misconduct. This effort can be led by FDLE, which can require agencies to register and report all allegations, and that system is then shared
with all agencies. There is also a monetary benefit to a “repeat offender” reporting program. Investigations have found that the cost of legal settlements due to an officer who had two or more misconduct allegations is more than $3 billion, in an examination of only 25 of the country’s largest law enforcement agencies in just the past decade (Alexander et al., 2022). In Yonkers, New York, alone, police misconduct settlements totaled over $5.5 million (Brannstorm, 2022). Such hefty settlements also have serious implications for taxpayers; thus, effectively addressing this issue will help improve public sentiment.

6.0 Conclusions and Future Research

Summary of Key Findings

Policy Scan

The Campaign Zero project aims to identify effective solutions to decrease use of force incidents. The project, known as #8CantWait, specifies eight reforms that police departments can adopt to make substantive changes to the frequency of use of force, particularly excessive use of force. These reforms include requiring officers to: attempt to de-escalate situation; employ a continuum for the use of force; ban chokeholds and strangleholds; issue warnings prior to shooting; ban shooting at moving vehicles; exhaust all alternatives prior to the use of force; intervene if another
officer is using excessive force; and provide comprehensive reporting of use of force. Based on these recommendations, we collected and reviewed the use of force policies of all 65 Florida police agencies included in the study to identify whether they address any of the proposed rules.

We found that comprehensive reporting is the policy that was included most frequently (96.9% of agencies), and warning before shooting is the policy that was included the least frequently (61.5% of agencies). With respect to the other #8CantWait recommendations: banning chokeholds and strangleholds was addressed by 72.3% of agencies; requiring de-escalation was addressed by 80.0% of agencies; duty to intervene was addressed by 80.0% of agencies; having a use of force continuum was included in the policies of 81.5% of agencies; banning shooting at moving vehicles was addressed by 84.6% of agencies; and exhausting all alternatives was addressed by 87.7% of agencies. When examining individual agencies, we found that the following 20 agencies have adopted all #8CantWait policies: Boynton Beach, Broward County, Clearwater, Coral Gables, Edgewood, Fernandina Beach, Jacksonville, Jefferson County, Kenneth City, Kissimmee, Lake Wales, Longwood, Manatee County, Miramar, New Smyrna, North Miami, Palm Springs, Port Orange, Volusia County, and Winter Springs. We also found that the following six agencies have adopted half or fewer of the fewest recommended policies: Baker County (4), DeSoto County; (4), North Port (4), Bradenton (3), Oviedo (2), and Citrus County (2).

It is important to note that the number of agencies that report use of force incidents to FDLE has decreased by approximately 20% (down to just 52). Although the direction for addressing public concerns should be toward openness and the provision of more information, this pattern of opting-out of reporting signals a movement away from transparency. This pattern may also suggest that
as time passes after high-profile excessive force events, agency officials may believe that transparency is less of a priority due to the dimming of the national “spotlight” on particularly egregious misconduct. We hope that our findings encourage police agencies to keep transparency at the forefront at all times.

Statistical Analysis

Analysis of 8 Can’t Wait policies’ on use of force reports indicate that three policies have a depressive affect on Use of Force incident reports. Statistically, using a Poisson distribution model, there was a lower rate of use of force incidents reported in jurisdictions that implemented policies requiring officers exhaust alternatives before using deadly force, use a continuum of force, and attempt de-escalation.

Modeling the relationship between sociodemographic factors and Use of force report rate did not indicate any clear trends. Statistically significant relationships were found between the dependent variable (per capita use of force reporting rate), and individual sociodemographic factors (e.g., proportion of the population in an age, race, or income category) but limited trends were found within categories (e.g., different age, income, or home value brackets), with two exceptions. First, the percentage of housing unit vacancy increases the transformed rate of use of force reports. Second, the percentage of the population identifying as Black (~8.1978) increased the transformed rate of use of force reports more than the percentage of the population that identifies as White (~7.2532). The lack of any trends may be due to the small number (n = 204) of jurisdictions for which there are reports. We suggest that data be collected from additional jurisdictions to increase the observation count and include spatial data with these reports to allow additional types of analyses to be run.
There are multiple barriers to using the Use of Force data collected and reported to the FDLE by Florida police agencies. The first is the requirement of submitting a public records request, and the length of time spent fulfilling the request. The second barrier to using these data is the format the data comes in (i.e., PDF) is not conducive to analysis. The third barrier is that not all fields are consistently reported, limiting the usefulness of the data. A fourth barrier to analysis is that the data reported has no spatial components, preventing any meaningful spatial analysis of these reports. To ensure greater police transparency there need to be substantial reforms to improve data access and quality.

**Interviews**

This examination was informed by interviews with police leaders, which were intended to provide more nuance in understanding various issues related to use of force. During this interview, we asked police leaders to give their perspectives on a number of reform-related topics, especially with respect to the effectiveness and feasibility of each of the eight policies recommended by Campaign Zero as well as any other important policies they believe should be added to the conversation. We also inquired about their understanding of the circumstances that influence use of force based on their experience, and about how often use of force training is necessary and how use of force incidents are investigated. Additionally, we asked the leaders about how they ensure policy compliance, which factors are involved in instituting policy changes when needed, and what efforts they make in ensuring transparency such as reporting use of force data to the FBI.
In the qualitative interviews with police leaders, several important themes emerged within their responses. First, although many leaders agreed with the “spirit” of the proposed use of force policies within the 8Can’tWait campaign, they expressed reservations about implementing these policies due to concerns about officers’ safety. If included in their use of policies, which many did include, the prohibitions were conditional or prefaced by some form of “when feasible” language. Based on popular discourse, such conditional policies may not assuage the public’s concerns about preventing excessive force, in that some community members may never view a potentially fatal chokehold or shots fired at moving vehicle as necessary in any situation. Therefore, the need for exceptions to some, or all, use of force practices due to exigent circumstances should be properly explained to the public, and police trainers must be explicit in the need to exercise such exceptions on a rare basis. Second, the police leaders all expressed the importance of requiring and implementing the duty to intervene. They explained that an emphasis on this duty has been made particularly following the murder of George Floyd and the lack of intervention that could of prevented his death. Some leaders did point out that rapidly evolving events and related distractions could complicate officers’ ability to intervene. However, effective checks and balances related to the actions of fellow officers is integral to police legitimacy especially at a time where trust in the policing institution is at an all-time low (Ortiz, 2020).

Furthermore, police officials frequently discussed how law enforcement officers with longer careers have better outcomes with respect to use of force decisions, an observation that is also supported by empirical research. This part of the leaders’ discussions suggests that agencies should establish more extensive and effective use of force training for newer officers before they are assigned to shifts with direct police-citizen contact and/or that more experienced officers should
be included in patrol rotations. Additionally, we found that police leaders frequently made efforts to promote what they believed to be positive aspects about their agency and officers. This was interpreted as purposeful actions toward image management, which is understandable in the current sociopolitical climate and the associated demands for police reform, accountability, and transparency. While redirecting the focus to positive examples of policing and agencies’ stated commitments to ethical and legal behavior is vital, actions that represent substantive policy changes will be more effective both in terms of evolving standards in agencies as well as regaining public trust.

Additionally, police leaders often acknowledged that there were strained relationships between their agency and communities of color. While they typically highlighted that there were positive relationships with some members of communities of color, they also acknowledged that some people within these communities distrusted the police. They emphasized the work that their agency was doing to rebuild these historically strained relationships, often emphasizing the importance of informal community engagement activities. Some leaders also acknowledged that initiatives, such as community review boards, were helpful in establishing new relationships between the community and their agency. These discussions can indicate that more attention is being placed on creating strategies to build community trust, particularly with communities of color. Strong police-community relations are important to public safety, which is a mutual goal of police and the people they serve. Accordingly, police need—and should regularly seek—input from residents to design solutions to crime that ultimately (re)build social and structural health of the community.
In our interviews, police leaders addressed three predominant aspects of how their agencies remained current and at the forefront of policy development. They looked to other agencies’ policies in nearby geographic proximity and drew from external sources such as organizations, universities, and the private sector for best practices. Leadership also played an important role in guiding policy development and reform. Finally, they noted that learning from previous missteps triggered changes in use of force policies.

We conclude that police reform conversations should definitely include input from practitioners, especially with respect to the best methods of implementation for the much-needed reform. These conversations and planning, however, necessitate a collaborative effort between practitioners, council members, researchers, and community members who have a shared interest in maintaining public safety and ensuring accountability for agencies and officers who violate the public trust. Finally, while the interviews we conducted were very valuable and informative, we still had a low response rate. We believe that our examination could have been even more enlightening if there were more interview participants. Based on such a low response rate, we suggest that efforts to establish rapport between police leaders and researchers should be prioritized, as it will increase leaders’ willingness to participate in future studies. Researchers would greatly benefit from the assistance of policymakers and community advocates who already have well-established relationships with police agencies.

**Summary of Policy Recommendations**

Based on our research, we developed five broad recommendations for local police agencies and three broader state level recommendations. While these proposals are not exhaustive, they
represent the foundation for building public trust, improving training and community engagement, and ensuring more effective standardized data collection procedures.

Locally, our first recommendation is for police agencies to take action to address historically strained relationships with communities of color, particularly taking steps to improve transparency and communication with these communities. Second, we recommend that police take steps to formalize connection between the police and communities of color through community review boards and community policing programs. Our third recommendation was to improve access to critical training for police officers, including not only comprehensive use of force training but also cultural competency and implicit bias training, as well as showing strong leadership around police use of force and establishing agency Offices of Diversity, Equity and Inclusion. Fourth, we recommend police agencies take action to develop stronger collaborative research relationships and data transparency. Fifth, we recommend that local police agencies take steps to incorporate best practices around use of force, including those policies forwarded in national policy discussions.

At the state level, we strongly recommended and supported changes to improve the accessibility and transparency of data. First, we recommend better standardization of data collection for the FDLE, ensuring that all jurisdictions report complete data to the state databases, including detailed incident attributes with locational data, and maintaining this data in formats that are readily available to the public. Second, we recommended the creation of programs to incentivize more complete data reporting at the state and federal level, including dedicated funds to support data collection and reporting, and workshops to ensure that local agencies are trained in data collection
and reporting procedures. Finally, we strongly support the implementation of laws that ensure comprehensive data tracking and reporting, including both mandated reporting of use of force incidents to a publicly accessible database maintained by the FDLE and the establishment of a state system to ensure that officers that are terminated after repeated use of force incidents are not rehired by other police agencies in Florida.

Future Research Recommendations
Currently, the issue of police reform is ongoing as various proposals are discussed and the corresponding implementation procedures are fully planned. In the interest of continuing responsiveness to the reform efforts, and employing evidence-based practices, we propose three recommendations for future research in this area.

Restorative Justice and Procedural Justice
We recommend establishing methods for recognizing and redressing harm in hyper-policed communities, and then assessing differences in residents’ views about police following the implementation of those methods. Blount-Hill and colleagues (2022) explain that rebuilding the relationship between police and minority residents requires not only a substantive change in law enforcement policies, but also an “acknowledgment of previous wrongs, and explicit efforts to discontinue and [repair] that wrong” (p. 10). To this end, implementing restorative justice practices and procedural justice training may be key.

The goal of restorative justice is to provide harm-affected parties an opportunity for engagement in the resolution process, which can enhance community well-being. As explained by Pavlacic and
“building processes that facilitate and welcome participation from affected communities [when addressing police misconduct] could help address systemic policies and procedures that affect” marginalized groups (p. 2). Restorative justice practices can include providing “Know Your Rights” workshops for residents through a liaison officer so that messages about constitutional policing come from those who are tasked with maintaining and upholding the law (The Constitution Project, 2016). Practices can also include working with community leaders and other justice officials to provide services for individuals whose claims of excessive force have been sustained. For example, in 2021, the California Senate passed the first bill in the nation that extends victim services, including therapy, to survivors of police violence (Epstein, 2021). Being proactive in the provision of resources following such events can send a message to the community that police agencies are committed to the restoration of trust and legitimacy.

Procedural justice represents the extent to which community members view the justice system as fair, and police legitimacy is a large part of the justice process (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Weisburd et al., 2022). If residents view police actions as reasonable, they are more likely to cooperate and engage with legal authorities (John Jay College, 2020; Tyler, 2006). Among other things, procedural justice training teaches officers that their actions must be transparent, respectful, and impartial, and their interactions must include an opportunity for residents to voice their concerns and fully explain their side of events (Bolger & Walters, 2019). Empirical studies, including randomized experiments, have indicated benefits to this type of programming. For example, Wood and colleagues (2020) found that implementing procedural justice training in the Chicago Police Department reduced complaints against police and the use of force. Similarly, Weisburd and colleagues (2022) found that intensive procedural justice training (administered in Tucson,
Cambridge, and Houston) reduced arrests, positively influenced residents’ perceptions of police harassment and violence, and reduced crime. Such findings suggest that procedural justice training may be a viable strategy for ongoing repair of the relationship between police and marginalized communities, and similar studies should be carried out in other jurisdictions.

**Reducing Reliance on Adversarial Strategies**

We recommend the adoption and application of community-centered practices that are less adversarial and better received by residents, and then evaluating changes in residents’ perceptions about law enforcement officers. One of the main issues in police reform discussions is the use of practices that have disproportionate negative impacts on minority residents and communities. Frequently using strategies that solely aim to extinguish crime, without incorporating prosocial strategies to engage residents in crime prevention efforts, can alienate the same communities that police are said to protect. One such controversial tactic is militarization, in which agencies acquire and deploy military grade weaponry to address crime events (Balko, 2014). The availability of this type of equipment rose in the 1990s, under the 1033 program within the National Defense Authorization Act, and has continued to rise (Delehanty et al., 2017). For instance, the U.S. Department of Defense transferred approximately $1.5 billion worth of military-grade weaponry to police agencies between 2006 and 2014, including grenade launchers, bayonets, and bomb detonator robots (Rezvani et al., 2014). Even the display of this type of equipment may convey that police see residents as opponents rather than as people that are to be protected and served, which can resonate especially when military weaponry is present during demonstrations that intend to draw attention to instances of excessive force (Mack, 2021).
Another police strategy that residents may view as adversarial is order-maintenance (Broken Windows”) policing. It is undergirded by the proposition that unaddressed physical and social disorder (e.g., low-level offenses such as loitering and graffiti) encourages serious crimes (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). Although the practice intends to focus on certain behaviors or locations to prevent crimes, research has indicated that repeated contact with police under this practice has negative, long-term effects on residents including increases in psychological distress and decreases in trust of the police (Craig, 2020; Del Toro et al., 2019; Hough, 2013; Kohler-Haussman, 2018; Rios, 2011; White & Fridella, 2016). On the other hand, community-centered strategies that encompass collaborative problem-solving can improve collective efficacy and curb disorder (Jenkins, 2006; Lombardo & Lough, 2007). To accomplish this, police can form partnerships with local residents and groups, facilitate citizen input, and engage in face-to-face, positive communication with the public (Koslicki & Willits, 2018; President’s Task Force, 2015). Therefore, implementing less adversarial and more community-oriented practices can reduce friction between the police and local residents, thereby allowing trust and legitimacy to (re)form.

Community-Based Public Safety Initiatives and Social Well-Being Investments

We recommend establishing programs that share financial resources to invest in the overall social health and wellbeing of the community, and then assessing changes in both residents’ trust in policing and crime rates following the implementation of such programs and investments. The current structure of societal problem-solving greatly pulls on police resources, whereby citizens rely on police to assist with relatively minor problems, even including pet rescues. This type of catch-all policing may not only redirect services from areas of higher need, but can also have unintended consequences. As Sekhon (2021) explains, this model has led to outcomes wherein
help turns into harm: “The consequences can be tragic: a 911 call for help with a friend’s or family member’s mental health crisis could end with police using lethal force” (p. 112) (see also Sholtis, 2020).

To prevent these types of tragedies, several U.S. cities have developed programs that can independently support the health and security of residents without legal intervention. For instance, Albuquerque, Denver, Philadelphia, Portland, and San Francisco have created response teams, composed of unarmed civilians and/or behavioral health experts, to address emergencies that used to rely on police (Iannelli & Vaughn, 2021). As an example, San Francisco’s response team can have a large impact on reducing catch-all policing and increasing community-led efforts for safety, as the city’s police department responded to more than 50,000 mental health crisis calls in 2019, most of which can now be handled without law enforcement presence (Iannelli & Vaughn, 2021; Pereira, 2020). Also, in Los Angeles, a proposed public safety approach calls for investment in essentials such as housing and education, and the formation of community-led emergency response, representing a much-needed holistic view for improving social health and well-being (Hutchins, 2022).
7.0 References


Da Silva, C. (2022, August 31). Ohio police release bodycam video after officer fatally shoots Black man possibly holding a ‘vape pen.’ *NBC News*. https://nbcnews.to/3R3VJKo


University of Southern California. *Fatal Encounters.* Database. https://fatalencounters.org/


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Number of violent incidents reported by county sheriff's offices in Florida and the presence or absence of the policy of certain policies
Number of violent incidents reported by police departments in Florida and the presence or absence of the policy of certain policies.
Number of violent incidents reported by county sheriff's offices in Florida and the presence or absence of the policy of certain policies

Number of Reported Incidents
- 22 - 26
- 17 - 21
- 12 - 16
- 7 - 11
- 1 - 6

Ban Chokeholds Policy
- Policy Present
- Policy Absent
- No Data

Shooting data from FDLE,
Policies obtained from respective jurisdictions
Number of violent incidents reported by police departments in Florida and the presence or absence of the policy of certain policies

Number of Reported Incidents
- 17 - 20
- 13 - 16
- 10 - 12
- 6 - 9
- 1 - 5

Exhaust Alternatives Policy
- Policy Present
- Policy Absent
- No Data

Shooting data from FDE, Policies obtained from respective jurisdictions.
Number of violent incidents reported by police departments in Florida and the presence or absence of the policy of certain policies.
Number of violent incidents reported by county sheriff’s offices in Florida and the presence or absence of the policy of certain policies.
Number of violent incidents reported by police departments in Florida and the presence or absence of the policy of certain policies.
Number of violent incidents reported by county sheriff's offices in Florida and the presence or absence of the policy of certain policies
Number of violent incidents reported by police departments in Florida and the presence or absence of the policy of certain policies
Number of violent incidents reported by county sheriff's offices in Florida and the presence or absence of the policy of certain policies

Number of Reported Incidents
- 22 - 26
- 17 - 21
- 12 - 16
- 7 - 11
- 1 - 6

Duty to Intervene Policy
- Policy Present
- Policy Absent
- No Data

Shooting data from FDE, Policies obtained from respective jurisdictions.
Number of violent incidents reported by police departments in Florida and the presence or absence of the policy of certain policies.
Number of violent incidents reported by county sheriff's offices in Florida and the presence or absence of the policy of certain policies

Number of Reported Incidents
- 22 - 26
- 17 - 21
- 12 - 16
- 7 - 11
- 1 - 6

Comprehensive Reporting Policy
- Policy Present
- Policy Absent
- No Data

Shooting data from FDLE,
Policies obtained from respective jurisdictions.
Number of violent incidents reported by police departments in Florida and the presence or absence of the policy of certain policies.
Number of violent incidents reported by county sheriff's offices in Florida and the presence or absence of the policy of certain policies

Number of Reported Incidents
- 22 - 26
- 17 - 21
- 12 - 16
- 7 - 11
- 1 - 6

No Shooting at Moving Vehicles Policy
- Policy Present
- Policy Absent
- No Data

Shooting data from FDLE,
Policies obtained from respective jurisdictions
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